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ABSTRACT	  
 
Elimination of violence and establishment of sustainable peace have been 
among the longest-standing human ambitions. Violence with its paradoxical picture, 
however, has been an inseparable part of human history. Regarding different aspects 
and forms of violence, it could be defined as something to do with a change in the 
“normal” state of affairs.  
According to mentioned definition of violence, a comprehensive 
understanding of this phenomenon is tied to proper understanding of political life. As 
a result of the main characteristic of modern state, “ the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force in the enforcement of its order”, violence could be classified in 
legitimate and illegitimate. In other words, modern state by introducing itself as 
sovereign, which is considered as natural, for-granted and even necessary to keep 
order and maintain security, has the right to define “normal state”, make decision on 
“the state of exception” and accordingly legitimize violence in different scales.  
To explain the role of modern state in legitimized violence, I employed the 
concept of camp, which is according to Giorgio Agamben the fundamental 
biopolitical paradigm of modern societies. Hence, illustrating the similarities between 
variety camps in states with different political, economic and ideological structures, 
could disclose the real violent face of modern state. Suspension of the state of law and 
dehumanization are two common processes that are employed by state in camps to 
legitimize violence against people.  
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Chapter	  one:	  Introduction	  
 
Elimination of violence and introduction of sustainable peace have been 
among the longest-standing human ambitions. Regardless of the social, economic and 
political systems at play, humans have always strived to curb violence and promote 
peace at the same time. Despite those efforts, war, which is most obvious 
manifestation of violence, has been an inseparable part of human history, so much so 
that we place historic periods in pre- or post-war categories.  
In other words, despite efforts by philosophers, politicians and social activists 
in different periods throughout history, violence has been omnipresent in human life, 
so much so that some thinkers and schools of thought view violence as an instinctive 
part of human life which is necessary and at times useful in the evolution of human 
history.  
Other thinkers have rejected the theory that describes violence as a natural 
phenomenon. They regard violence as a social constructed phenomenon which can be 
avoided both individually and socially. Although the theoretical endeavors of the 
latter represent a broad spectrum, they have provided activists and students with an 
in-depth theoretical framework to work on. Of course, existence of rich literature and 
an in-depth theoretical framework does not necessarily translate into easy research; 
rather at times it can further complicate things.  
In addition to theoretical differences surrounding violence, the complicated 
forms violence has taken on as a result of technological advances along with its 
emergence from behind the colorful masks of modern life have made research in this 
area all the more difficult. A quick look at newspapers and news websites reveals the 
prevalence in society of different forms of violence such as domestic violence, child 
abuse, cyber violence, violence against women, school and workplace violence, 
violence against religious and ethnic minorities, violence against protesters and 
demonstrators, civil wars, etc.  
The shocking number of news stories about violence in modern societies 
which claim to be on the path of evolution shows that the necessity to study violence 
is felt more than ever before and that such research should be a top priority to sustain 
human life.          
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By putting violence in different categories such as individual, social and 
international, modern societies try to present themselves as entities which pursue the 
root causes of violence in their bid to bring it under control, prevent the repeat of 
violent acts, and ease the sufferings of the victims of violence. Such efforts cover a 
wide range of anti-violence measures designed to promote peace and beef up security. 
Conferences organized by universities and articles penned by academics on violence 
against women and children, campaigns targeting racial discrimination and violation 
of human rights, and international conferences to promote peace in conflict zones are 
all symbolic efforts by modern societies to contain violence and maintain peace and 
stability.  
Sustaining the modern way of political life which has manifested itself in the 
form of nation-state relations depends on the containment of violence by governments 
or international governmental organizations such as the United Nations. This goal is 
manifested in the preamble of UN charter clearly: “to save succeeding generations 
from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to 
mankind, … to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security”. 
According to these dreams all the efforts to globalize the values enshrined in the 
Declaration on Human Rights and promote legitimate defense as well as preventive 
and just wars as being conventional are all in line with the containment of violence 
even by employing legal violence that contributes to stability and sustainability.  
So, claims by modern societies that they have been successful in lowering the 
level of violence have always been challenged by critics. Regardless of quantitative 
comparisons when it comes to levels of violence in modern and traditional societies, 
qualitative factors such as the level of social awareness and accumulation of 
experience should not be overlooked. Besides, thanks to technological advances, the 
destructiveness of violence is not comparable with the past.  
Two world wars, the horrendous experience of ethnic violence, colonialism 
and its repercussions which are still being felt in civil wars around the world today, 
and the use of atomic weapons are all catastrophes committed in modern times by 
modern governments. These violent incidents cast doubt on claims by modernists that 
their measures to monopolize violence have actually helped contain violence.  
The existence of a wide spectrum of theories on violence on the one hand, and 
the complicated nature different forms of violence take on, on the other, has resulted 
in different categorizations of violence. Regarding all different categorization, in the 
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method I have chosen to study violence in my dissertation, violence falls into two 
categories: illegitimate and legitimized.  
Illegitimate violence is the kind of violence commission of which is illegal 
and punishable by law. In addition to illegality, such violence is condemnable in the 
court of public opinion and its commission draws a backlash from society. Illegality is 
the most important factor in defining illegitimate violence. Any drop in the number of 
illegitimate violence cases is an index for human evolution. Modern societies claim 
that they have decreased the number of cases involving illegitimate violence, as 
compared with pre-modern societies, by giving the government a monopoly on 
violence and use of force. 
So illegitimate violence could be defined as the kind of violence which is 
committed by someone outside the government in an attempt to disturb order and 
“normal state”. Such violent measures could be in line with individual or group 
interests. The legal system uses penal and disciplinary mechanisms to prevent the 
repeat of such violence. In fact, illegitimate violence is a kind of violence that is not 
originated from the monopolized source of use of force.   
There is a second kind of violence which could be defined as legitimized 
violence because of its origin, the tools which are used to commit it, and the 
institutions that have those tools at their disposal. As it was stated before the 
monopoly over violence in modern societies lies in the hands of the government. 
Governments use such violence against individuals they accuse of seeking to disturb 
law and order. Such violence relies on legality and legitimacy.  
In other words, in order to maintain and sustain their structures, modern 
governments rely on the kind of stability and order which becomes only possible 
through their unbridled power. They say failure to maintain stability and security or 
what is sometimes portrayed as peace does not stem from structural deficiencies or 
fundamental defects of state in its modern form; rather, it has its roots in the 
disruptive measures taken by those who are opposed to the accepted norms of nation-
state system. So modern governments use the kind of violence they view as legitimate 
to counter on both local and international fronts any attempt at changing this system. 
They build on concepts such as national security, international peace and security, and 
sustainable peace to justify their conduct. In fact, dual concepts such as legitimized 
and illegitimate violence have been created to justify modern state and the nation-
state system as the only way to sustain human life.   
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Before leaving this subject behind and posing the main questions this study is 
designed to answer, I need to draw your attention to the key role of sovereignty in 
creating dual concepts such as legitimized and illegitimate violence, security and 
insecurity, and war and peace. It is the sovereignty that determines the boundaries of 
these dual concepts which in turn play a key role in the macro-policies on national 
and international levels.  
In fact, without dealing with the mysteries of sovereignty one cannot focus on 
legitimized violence. Today the concept of violence, its redefinition and its relation to 
violence is so important in socio-political discussions that it always tops the list of 
items to be discussed.  
In order to better understand the relation between sovereignty and legitimized 
violence, one needs to introduce an objective example shared by all governments. For 
example, a shared behavior which has its roots in a shared logic can serve our 
purpose. Camp can play such a role in the relationship between sovereignty and 
legitimized violence.   
The concept of camp, as put forth in the works of Giorgio Agamben, can 
provide us with a perfect objective example. That it appears in different forms, stems 
from sovereign power, governments have shared logic in creating it, and there is an 
unwritten law in its internal organization, lends camp the capability to portray the link 
between sovereignty and legitimized violence in the best way possible.  
The main question of this thesis is whether state in its modern form – nation-
state – is the root cause of legitimized violence.  
Of course there are some secondary questions that help put to the test the 
assumptions of the theory.  
1. What is legitimized violence and how does the modern government employ it?  
2. What is the relationship between sovereignty and legitimized violence? 
3. What is camp and how does it reveal the role of the modern state and its 
sovereignty regarding violence?  
And finally the question that is posed to challenge the existing trends.  
4. Is it possible to achieve sustainable peace in a system made up of modern states 
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1-­‐1.	  Brief	  description	  of	  the	  thesis	  	  	  
 
The thesis is composed of four chapters. As I have already discussed here, I 
try to make clear the purposes of the paper; to illustrate the role of modern state in 
legitimized violence and the function of sovereignty toward the legitimizing process 
of violence. In this way, it seems to be necessary to begin with definition of some key 
conceptual words like violence, legitimized violence and sovereignty. In current 
chapter an introduction to the study of violence and its necessities is outlined, and 
followed by a general introduction and purpose of study. In addition, a 
methodological approach which is useful for this paper is described briefly. 
In second chapter I will explain the difficulties and vagueness in definition of 
violence. By discussing the main theoretical approaches, the definition of legitimized 
violence would be concluded based on Hannah Arendt, Walter Benjamin and Zizek. 
The nexus between violence and politics, law making violence and law preserving 
violence and direct or indirect role of state in various forms of violence are the key 
concepts of this chapter. 
 In the next chapter, I will explain the role of sovereignty in the process of 
legitimization of violence by modern state. According to a historical approach, the 
concept of sovereignty would be deconstructed to explain how a combination of 
theological characteristics of modern state and monopolized right of use of force 
legitimize violence. The transformation of sovereignty is discussed from Foucault 
point of view and concluded to Agamben theoretical approach in relation between 
modernity and sovereignty. 
In the last chapter the concept of camp as a symbol of legitimized violence 
would be introduced. At the first step, the concept of camp is described and expanded 
to a general situation in relation between people and states. Then, five camps in five 
countries by different ideological, economic and political structures are compared to 
clarify the similarities between them in the process of legitimization of violence 
through denationalization and dehumanization of people. Nazi concentration camps, 
Guantanamo Bay detention camp, forced work camps in Soviet Union, Kahrizak 
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1-­‐2.	  Research	  motivation	  
 
For a humanities student in Iran, the political subjects are not just theoretical 
approaches which should be studied at the class. In fact, contrasts between nations 
and governments and social crises go beyond theoretical concepts. Daily life in my 
homeland is a reflection of the theories students come across in books and articles. So 
when you enter higher education to make a difference, your social surroundings turn 
into an arena in which social and political abnormalities are taken on. The more you 
get involved in social realities, the more you begin to find the role of political system 
in social crisis. 
Over the past century Iranian society has tried to achieve democracy, social 
justice and sustainable development. During this time, governments with different 
political ideologies have been responded to the demands of people violently. 
Similarities in the employed policies of Islamic government with previous Pahlavi 
dictatorship regarding people have been motivated me as political science student in 
Iran to investigate modern state and its violent behavior regardless of ideological and 
structural differences. In fact, I want to explain the nature of modern state, as a 
construction of contemporary political thoughts, is violent. An idea that can be 
expanded to any forms of government. 
As a start point to my study, one day as a game I gave to some of my friends 
ten pages of speeches without name and ten names of the famous politicians to match 
to speeches. The result was shocking and motivating for me. Seven of ten student 
added the name of Ayatollah Khomeini- the leader of Islamic revolution of Iran- to 
the speech of Vladimir Lenin. Five of those matched Adolf Hitler to the speeches of 
Australian government against refugee. And the most interesting answer was about 
putting the name of Ahmadinejad, former president of Iran at the end of the speeches 
of David Cameron, prime minister of United Kingdom, against London riots at 2011. 
According to my background and the conclusion of this game I found that the 
similarity between states in labeling their oppositions is not related to their superficial 
ideological differences. Thus, this paper is the result of my motivation to explain the 
common element in all modern states which naturalized nation-state, dehumanization 
of its oppositions, and legitimized violence against them. 
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1-­‐3.	  Instead	  of	  methodology;	  the	  trap	  of	  methodological	  nationalism	  
 
Employing a methodological approach would be less problematic when a 
research paper is focused to analyze an occurred violence in a specified place or 
historical event. The main concern of this kind of study is to explain the historical, 
economic or political reasons of violence, determine the perpetrators and victims of 
violence and how to transform violent situation to a peaceful one in a given political 
system. But when your assumption is that the main source of violence is the political 
system you would be faced with a lack of methodological approaches. Regarding this 
situation, a useful methodological approach is needed to criticize for granted concepts 
of current political system. Accordingly, I will start by introducing methodological 
nationalism as my general point of view in methodology and continue with discourse 
analysis as my methodology. 
Methodological nationalism is a dominant conceptual tendency that has 
shaped social sciences, and consequently impressed our understanding of the world 
order. Wimmer and Schiller define it as the naturalization of the nation-state by the 
social science. However, in spite of the considerable contradicted currents – such as 
political economy in the Marxian traditions and methodological individualism in the 
school of marginal utility and rational choice – methodological nationalism has been a 
hegemonic approach in the social sciences. In fact, it is realized as the assumption that 
the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world 
(Wimmer and Schiller, 2002). Therefore, the buttress of the epistemic structures and 
programs of mainstream social sciences have been relied upon the experience of 
modern nation-state formation. 
Within the discussion of methodological nationalism there are some already 
granted propositions; first of all, it considers societies as equal as nation-state 
societies, in which the foundation of social-scientific analysis are states and their 
governments. Then, the division of humanity into a limited number of nations is 
conceived as a natural process; toward this process, different nations categorize 
themselves as nation-states, internally, and set boundaries to differentiate themselves 
from other nation-states, externally, whereby the latter delamination – together with 
the competition between nation-states – represent the most fundamental categories of 
political organization (Beck, 2003). However, in order to depict how our 
understanding in analyzing the world structures, the arisen conflicts of these 
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structures, and the solutions of these conflicts has been trapped by methodological 
nationalism, three different modes of it are discussed below. Theses modes intersect 
and mutually reinforce each other, forming a coherent epistemic structure, a self-
reinforcing framework of observing and explaining the social world.  
According to the first mode, ignorance, the classical social theory has a blind 
spot, where the discussion is in regards to realizing the emergence of nation-state 
together with nationalism and ethnicity. In one hand, this ignorance could be ascribed 
to a disciplinary division of labor at the beginning of twentieth century, in which the 
study of the rise of nationalism and the nation-state was delegated to history and only 
communal identities and nation-building processes outside Europe and the United 
States were made the domains of anthropology and later of development studies 
(Wimmer, 1999). 
On the other hand, even it could be traced to a methodological problem 
whereby an established fact is in the background of the most sophisticated theorizing 
about the modern condition that nationalist forms of inclusion and exclusion bind 
modern societies together (Berlin, 1979); the problem has been shown by Billig for 
everyday discourse and practice, and it holds true for grand theory’s encounters with 
the social world as well: “ because they were structured according to nation-state 
principles, these became so routinely assumed and ‘banal’, that they vanished from 
sight altogether” (Billig, 1995).  
The ignorance is often combined with ‘naturalization’ – which is the process 
of the determination of the limit and definition of the unit of analysis by taking for 
granted the boundaries of the nation-state – and ‘territorial limitation’, which puts 
restrictions for the study of social processes to the political and geographic boundaries 
of a particular nation-state (Wimmer and Schiller, 2003). 
The functionality of this process strongly depends upon the categorization of 
the social science project into different "national" academic areas, a process highly 
influenced by both nationalist thinking itself, and the institutions of the nation-state 
organizing, along with the social science thinking in universities, research institutions 
and government think tanks. The proposed solution of national problems in different 
scopes such as economics, politics, and social services is addressed through the main 
research programs of funding bodies. The connection between educational institutes 
and national ministries of education has led most of the studies to a national-oriented 
approach (Wimmer and Schiller, 2002). 
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In addition, most of statistics and other systematic data are produced by 
government departments of nation-states and therefore take the national population, 
economy and polity as their given entity of observation (Smith, 1983), therefore it is 
realized why naturalizing the nation-state has become a part of the everyday routine 
of postwar social sciences, in international relations as much as in economics, history 
or anthropology. As a result, after World War II, nation building and state formation 
are considered natural in the works of modernization theorists, since the nation-state 
model represented the only considerable way of organizing politics (Wimmer and 
Schiller, 2003). 
Finally, the last mode is territorial limitation in which to the ‘state’ is 
generally realized to be a sovereign system of government within a specific territory. 
In political science, this has seen the emergence of a mainstream theory that 
understands the state as a neutral playing ground for different interest groups – 
therefore excluding from the picture the fact that the modern state itself has entered 
into a symbiotic relationship with the nationalist political project (Wimmer and 
Schiller, 2002). 
In the territorialization of social science, the social sciences have become 
obsessed with explaining processes within nation-state boundaries as contrasted with 
those outside, and have accordingly lost sight of the links between such nationally 
defined territories. Wimmer and Schiller assert it as follows: “to cast this in an image 
… the web of social life was spun within the container of the national society, and 
everything extending over its borders was cut off analytically – similar to the way a 
pancake takes on a discrete shape, separated from the batter, once it is laid on a hot 
griddle, to switch to a kitchen metaphor”. The container society surrounds a culture, a 
polity, an economy and a bounded social group. Major theoretical debates evolved 
around the relative weight of each of these dimensions in structuring the whole social 
fabric – Parsonians voting for culture while Marxists are interested in economy – and 
whether society determined individual actions or the other way round, with social 
structures coming up from individual agency. There were very few opinions given to 
why the boundaries of the container society are conducted as they are and what 
consequences flow from this methodological limitation of the analytical horizon – so 
that removing trans-border connections and processes from the picture (Wimmer and 
Schiller, 2002).  
 
	   10	  
1-­‐4.	  Research	  method;	  discourse	  analysis	  
 
Applying a research method that criticize the naturalization of the concepts in 
social science seems to be necessary for escaping from the trap of methodological 
nationalism. Thus, discourse analysis is employed to explain the historical origins of 
the concepts such as violence and sovereignty. In fact, in this paper, discourse as one 
of the most prevalent terms in different branches of social sciences is related to the 
work of Michel Foucault (1926-1984).  According to Foucault, discourse is “social 
construction of reality, a form of knowledge that determines what is knowable, 
sayable and doable in a particular historical context” (Foucault, 1977).  
It could be said that focus of this approach is on context. Discourse analysis, 
however, is the study of both text and context, which are two kinds of data that 
provide the communicative content of an utterance (Schiffrin, 2005).The nexus 
between text and context has been made the term discourse analysis ambiguous and 
multidisciplinary; two characteristics that can be puzzling in definition of any term. 
As a result of such vagueness, it can be concluded that discourse is a multi-model 
(Alba-Juez, 2009) and can be categorized in different approaches. But the common 
denominator of all these approaches is that they are interested in language in use 
rather than focus on language as an abstract system. Based on this characteristic, the 
discipline has been called “discourse analysis” instead of “language analysis”(Alba-
Juez, 2009) .  
In spite of methodological nationalism in which state is considered as a natural 
unit of social life, the meanings in discourse analysis are social constructed and there 
is no meaning of the world intrinsically (Schram, 1993). As a result, social 
constructionists have developed discourse analysis. Regarding this relation, 
distinguishing basic pillars of social constructionism can be considered as first step of 
using discourse analysis as a research tool. Main assumptions of constructionism 
include: first, people cannot be objective and then they can construct their own 
versions of reality. Second, since language is a social and cultural thing, our 
perception of reality is socially and culturally constructed. Finally, people are 
products of social interaction (Potter, 1996). Hence, discourse analysis is a way of 
understanding social interaction. 
Although constructionist theory does not directly guide discourse analysis in 
particular ways, a constructionist epistemology leads the discourse analyst towards a 
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specific kind of analytic interpretation (Nikande, 2007).Thus, distinguishing different 
dimensions of discourse, which are based on constructionism, is prerequisite to apply 
it. Three interrelated aspects of discourse are identifiable: 
 
1- The object of analysis (including verbal, visual or verbal and visual texts); 
2- The process of object production and receiving (writing, speaking, designing 
and reading, listening, viewing) by subjects; 
3- The socio-historical situations (contexts) that govern these process(Janks, 
2002).  
Regarding to these aspects, discourse analysis is employed to explain the 
historical roots of sovereignty and violence. Regarding the assumptions and 
dimensions of this research method I will try to illustrate how modern state and 
nation-state are social constructed in which sovereignty legitimize violence against 
excluded people. According to this purpose, two mutual processes of dehumanization 
and denationalization would be analyzed in the relation of sovereign power and 
people. 
Furthermore, discourse analysis is related to identity construction. In this way, 
discourse is more than just language that we use to show who we are. The way we 
dress, the gesture we use and even the food we eat influence how we display social 
identity. Discourse, then, “involve the socially situated identities that we enact and 
recognize in the different setting that we interact in (Gee, 2005). Hence, social 
identities are not pre-given, but are formed in the use of language and other ways we 
use to display ourselves. “People are who they are because of the way they talk not 
because of who they are” (Cameron, 1999). Accordingly, it would be discussed how 
sovereign state introduces itself as the only source of identity through nationalism. 
Regarding this process of identity making, modern state determine who is deserve to 
be considered as people, nation or more precisely who can be included in society and 
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Chapter	  Two:	  Legitimized	  Violence	  
 
2-­‐1.	  The	  concept	  of	  violence:	  
 
We are faced with a paradoxical picture of violence in modern life. That is 
why Jürgen Habermas depicts the twentieth century as “gas chambers, total war, 
state-sponsored genocide and extermination camps, brainwashing, state security 
apparatuses, and the panoptic surveillance of entire populations” (Habermas, 2001) 
but on the other hand, notwithstanding this intimidating picture, some believe that 
modern societies seem better equipped than traditional communities to handle 
conflicts in a relatively peaceful fashion. To make their case, they argue that acts of 
violence in modern societies are on the decline (Joas, 1999). 
This paradox has its roots in the conceptual vagueness of the definition of 
violence. In fact, consensus is elusive even among scholars as far as the definition of 
‘violence’ is concerned (Estanko, 2003). However, working on the concept of 
violence and the ambiguity associated with it is not merely a scholarly concern. In the 
absence of consensus on the definition of violence, we would not be able to employ 
proper means and mechanisms to combat violence, and consequently our strategies 
and approaches to achieving durable peace would, at best, be on shaky ground. Such 
failure in turn could cost some people their lives. Hence, development of scientific 
insight into violence is one of the most immediate tasks of our time. Given that this is 
a matter of extreme urgency, the fact that our knowledge about it is so limited is 
shocking (Turpin and Kurz, 1997). In spite of this conceptual vagueness and 
paradoxical picture, it can be safely argued that violence is a ubiquitous phenomenon, 
one which is present in national and international arenas, and has long been part of 
both our public and private lives. 
To clarify the definition of violence in this paper, it would be useful to draw 
attention to two interrelated meanings of the word violence which are rooted in Latin 
and seem inseparable from its present-day usage. On the one hand, Violentia means 
vehemence which is forcefulness of expression or intensity of emotion and conviction 
(Imbush, 2003); on the other, Violare refers to an infringement of certain rules or 
norms. In light of the latter, a common way of defining violence is to focus on 
criminal violence and contend that resorting to the use of force that is banned under 
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law constitutes violence (Riedel and Welsh, 2002). According to this definition there 
is a one-way relation between violence and law and what we describe as violence can 
only cover interpersonal relationships in which there is always a perpetrator and a 
recipient, whereas later in this paper we will discuss how these two concepts are 
interactive. The two meanings of the word always seem to merge. Rarely does the 
word “violence” merely refer to sheer force; rather, it refers to a qualified force, one 
which is excessive or goes beyond certain limits (Bufacchi, 2005).  
In addition to being interrelational, violence is a relative concept. Its meaning 
changes from one society and one point in time to another; besides, it is so subjective 
in content that an act which is viewed as utterly violent by someone might not be so, 
or at least not to the same degree, for another individual (Garay, 2008). So it can be 
argued that because violence is always relative, it defies definition. In other words, in 
light of the fact that violence is a multifaceted, socially constructed and highly- 
ambivalent phenomenon, it is extremely difficult to define it (Haan, 2009). Anyway 
violence has a subversive undertone which has something to do with a change in the 
“normal” state of affairs (Zizek, 2008). The key concept of this definition of violence 
is the “normal” state of affairs. What is the normal state and who defines this can tie 
the concept of violence to politics. 
 
2-­‐2.	  Violence	  and	  political	  life:	  
 
As for the characteristics of violence it can be said that the problems 
associated with violence may be of great importance in developing a proper 
understanding of political life, yet the concept of violence remains elusive as ever and 
often misconstrued (Bufacchi, 2005). To highlight the close link between violence 
and political life Charles Tilly states that in the centralized states of the modern world, 
collective violence and political conflict cannot be regarded as discrete phenomena. 
Whether violent or not, political conflicts generally emanate from the same kind of 
causal processes and are in accord with a similar logic. Certain elements might 
heighten the tension and render some players better prepared to resort to more risky 
and violent means. Anyway, it should be noted that at least in principle there is 
always the possibility for a conflict to turn nasty (Tilly, 2003). 
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Tilly goes on to claim that “altogether about 100 million people died in the 
twentieth century as a direct result of action by organized military units backed by 
one government or another. A comparable number of civilians likely died of war-
induced disease and other indirect effects” (Tilly, 2002). 
By virtue of these ghastly developments, it may perhaps be understandable 
that an in-depth approach to fathoming the many forms of violence and its relation to 
political life is conspicuous by its absence. Consequently there is no mechanism to 
stop violence from taking a toll on the lives of millions of people on a daily basis. If 
images mean more than mere words, what transpired in the 20th century, or in the 
preceding ones for that matter, surely did not create enough desire to learn more about 
violence. However, if there is genuine willingness to put a lid on violence or contain it 
more successfully, it is imperative that we come up with an inclusive definition of 
violence and consequently develop a better understanding of this phenomenon. Thus, 
it is of great significance to explore the root cause of violence, digest its essence and 
importance, and develop an insight into where it stands in reference to power, the 
state, and domination and into how it is linked to the public realm and legitimacy. 
In order to get to the bottom of this interconnected network of concepts, a 
step-by-step approach would be necessary. Traditional conceptions of power look at 
coercion from a biological point of view and regard it as a force with an inner desire 
to expand. Such an approach to violence is dangerous because its supposedly creative 
results provide a rationale for acts of violence which is then regarded as a sought-after 
beneficial activity. And metaphorical notions that violence and creation are naturally 
linked result in the glorification of the former (Arendt, 1970). 
Notwithstanding traditional beliefs, in modernity, to think of violence as 
having a positive, integrating function is almost an anathema; only danger and 
impurity remain. This modern desire to expel violence, to keep it concealed and out of 
sight -as occurs with everything impure- in political theory would seem to translate 
itself, when not in silence, in a manifest difficulty to speak of violence as a political 
problem (Balibar, 2002). Nevertheless, the roots of modern political philosophy could 
be traced back to a link between violence and power, and the link in question is so 
unshakable that one could claim that violence and political power are two mutually 
constitutive concepts in modern times.  
In modern political thoughts, any effort to trace this mutuality would seem 
incomplete in the absence of reference to Thomas Hobbes. The Leviathan is created – 
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through a covenant – as a political resolution to a state of nature which is 
hypothetically murderous. This agreement lies at the center of all legitimacy, but an 
impossible contradiction rears its ugly head here. On the one hand, the sovereign is 
entitled to resort to violence as long as he abides by the terms of the deal which 
require him to stand up for the safety of citizens. In other words, the use of force 
against those who fail to adhere to the provisions of the deal is acceptable. On the 
other hand, however, citizens have the right to commit acts of violence against the 
sovereign if he fails to comply with the terms of the covenant -otherwise it would not 
be a covenant. This envisages no solution to the problems that would emerge in case 
of a rebellion. A circular logic which offers no way out is thus created. Restoration by 
the sovereign of order will amount to compliance with the deal and entitles him to the 
use of violence. His failure to restore order, on the other hand, translates into his 
inability to guarantee the security of citizens and justifies violence against him. In the 
end, those who successfully commit violence achieve legitimacy which implicitly 
translates into the rule of the strongest (Howes, 2003). 
Furthermore, it could be said that in modern times political possibility 
presupposes the possibility of violence. Max Weber hinted at this puzzling 
interconnection when he famously defined the state as a “political association ... 
[whose] administrative staff successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order” (Weber, 2009). Initial 
calculations thus suggest that the link between violence and politics is quite obvious. 
In modern societies, the concentration of force in the hands of the state always 
amounts to a political resolution – despite the state’s partiality – to the problem of 
violence (Garay, 2008). 
There is no actor, group or struggle that can be called political, which does not 
seek to gain at least a certain amount of influence over the deployment of physical 
force. It should be noted that violence is a major component of politics and the chain 
linking the two is much stronger than what a mere instrumental relationship would 
suggest. At least it does not contribute to the achievement of an end in the same way 
others do. That is because “… it is possible to define the 'political' character of a 
corporate group only in terms of the means peculiar to it, the use of force...” (Weber, 
1964). 
The specter of conflict and the possibility of violence will hang over the world 
as long as politics – as it is even shaped by the democratic revolution of modern times 
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– persists. Although one can go too far in stating the fact that the use of violence is 
unnecessary, in essence, violence remains an integral part of politics as long as it is a 
possibility or a threat. What is of consequence here is the dual sense – both positivity 
and negativity – in which violence is a component of politics. Societies in modern 
times seem to be grappling with an inevitably paradoxical picture in which political 
survival relies heavily on what modern society finds disgusting. The very same 
problem that politics sets out to resolve is part of what defines it: physical force poses 
a threat to the legitimacy of the very political order it helps create. The democratic 
process puts the possibility of violence at the heart of politics on a permanent basis, 
and at the same time lends a negative connotation to brute force in relation to politics. 
For “the dogma that the only legitimate authority is one that rests on the consent of 
the governed” makes it seem strange to “think of the lawful exercise of power by a 
democratic authority as an act of violence... since one does not naturally think in 
terms of self-coercion” (Wolin, 1963).  
The complexity of this paradoxical picture becomes clearer when we recall the 
fact that “the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” (Weber, 1964) 
implicitly suggests that the state takes on the task of distinguishing between legitimate 
and illegitimate violence. “The right to use physical force is ascribed to other 
institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state 
is considered the sole source of the right to use violence ” (Weber, 1964). So the onus 
is on politics to regulate violence. But this is certainly quite an unsatisfactory solution 
because the legitimacy of violence is decided by the same politics which happen to be 
founded on violence that needs to be legitimated. In other words, violence and politics 
together draw a circle which offers no way out, and there is no solution to the problem 
it poses: “the effect – the legitimation of violence – would have to become the cause” 
(Honig, 2007). 
This paradoxical relation suggests that any political theory cannot avoid being, 
intentionally or not, a theory of violence. Every political theory has to make certain 
assertions about violence: on its uses and its possible containment, on its efficacy and 
its justifications. To analyze the concept of violence and its relation to politics, I will 
start by Walter Benjamin who distinguished between two forms of violence that 
mutually presuppose and deconstruct each other; law making and law preserving 
violence. Then, I will analyze Arendt’s claim that violence is never legitimate. This 
argument is naturally linked to Weber’s conception of the state because it opposes 
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Weber’s monopoly of “legitimate violence”. Finally, I will borrow the categorization 
of violence by Zizek to explain what I mean by legitimized violence. 
 
2-­‐3.	  Benjamin,	  law	  making	  and	  law	  preserving	  violence	  
 
Benjamin believes every individual possesses a certain amount of potential 
violence. If every individual has natural ends, naturally they will use a variety of 
means to achieve them. Benjamin discusses the use of violence by someone to 
achieve a just end is no more problematic than their desire to make efforts toward a 
desired goal. This is very similar to the Platonic thesis that every individual has a 
conception of the good, and thus a natural proclivity to pursue that conception. To 
Benjamin, violence is simply the potential result of possession of ends by individuals 
and their employment of means which are bound to conflict with others around them. 
He claims, “these views have been recently rekindled by Darwin’s biology, which, in 
a thoroughly dogmatic manner, regards violence as the only original means, besides 
natural selection, appropriate to all the vital ends of nature” (Benjamin, 1996). 
As a consequence of the significance of violence to attain natural ends, it has a 
central role in law. Benjamin describes relations between means and ends as the most 
essential within a legal system. He argues that if violence does not belong in the 
ethical or legal category, it can only be looked for in the sphere of means, no matter 
what its justification or legitimization. Therefore, the basic dogma of any theory 
surrounding violence is that “just ends can be attained by justified means, justified 
means used for just ends” (Benjamin, 1996). Benjamin talks of two legal schools that 
diametrically legitimate violence: “natural law” and “positive law”.  
Benjamin does not throw his weight behind either school, although he 
recognizes measures by the school of “positive law” to focus attention on the 
justification of means, whereas the school of natural law thinks of violence as a semi-
organic “product of nature, as it were a raw material”. However, when both schools 
speak about violence they display belief in the instrumental nexus of ends and means, 
a common mistake shared by both. “Natural law builds on the justness of the ends in a 
bid to ‘justify’ the means; positive law tries to ‘guarantee’ the justness of the ends 
through justification of the means.” Benjamin, however, denies any criticism of 
violence based on the theory of just ends or just means. 
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This denial is both of theoretical and political significance. Whereas the stance 
of natural law is often considered when the focus is on legitimization of armed 
struggle against hegemony, colonialism or the state, the opposite position of positive 
law is normally put forth by the state in a bid to justify repression and institutionalized 
coercion. Although the two hold diametrically opposite views in their emphasis on 
either just ends or justified means, they share the belief that violence has always to be 
looked at within the causal realm of means and ends. Benjamin, however, states that 
independent criteria should be employed for both just ends and justified means. 
When it comes to models and patterns employed by the state, Benjamin draws 
a line between two forms of violence that rely on each other and deconstruct each 
other: “All violence as a means is either lawmaking or law-preserving” (Benjamin, 
1996). The former amounts to establishing and cementing power through violence, 
i.e. terror, war on terror, or “original accumulation”; the latter, however, is firmly 
established in state institutions. Benjamin calls these two forms of violence “mythic 
violence” because their integral dialectic results in a circular logic which is 
inescapable, that is to say, any act designed to destroy the law leads to a new positing 
of law which again violently attempts to preserve itself. For Benjamin this cycle 
which features overcoming the law by re-establishing it clearly indicates that there is 
something fundamentally “rotten in the law” (Benjamin, 1996).  
In practice, however, it is difficult to differentiate between these two forms of 
mythic violence. In the field of direct state repression, i.e. police force, law-preserving 
force and law-making violence are always blended spectrally (because police preserve 
law by enforcing new rules or by re-evaluating the established sanctions), whereas in 
the realm of the social order mythic violence has become almost invisible.  
In other words, in law-making, violence serves a dual purpose. Firstly, law 
preserves as its end what is to be established as law. An example of systemic violence 
here is the legal and governmental bodies responsible for passing legislation. 
Secondly, as its means, law preserves violence as the tool with which to accrue those 
ends. Systemic state-violence is present in this sense as the police force, the criminal 
justice system, and other bodies responsible for state-sanctioned restrictions upon 
individual liberty(Khatib, 2011). Law serves as a punitive counterweight against the 
violation of particular rules at the hands of individuals. Therefore, under the authority 
of the rational contract, the state resorts to violence to both establish and maintain the 
law. In fact, we have no choice but acknowledge and reciprocate the rational contract. 
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This forced consent is then used to generate the monopoly of violence that is 
represented by these two functions of the state's legal institutions. 
Therefore, violence must remain legally authorized within the body of 
systemic violence that controls others. Actual laws themselves are not as important as 
the fact that the powers of the law are maintained in total. The main result of this 
analysis of law-making violence is that the legal system and criminals have a common 
origin, that is, the seminal act of violence. Benjamin characterizes this shared ground 
in the figure of the ‘great criminal’ and says ‘criminals’ are those who act to achieve 
natural ends, but lack proof of their historical origin, so they cannot be legally 
authorized. In other words, the difference in origin between the state and the criminal 
should be sought in the fact that based on a natural end the state maintains a historical 
claim to legitimate violence that precedes that of the criminal (Benjamin, 1996). 
 
2-­‐4.	  Arendt;	  violence	  and	  the	  political	  
 
A step-by-step approach to define violence would be necessary if one wants to 
get an Arendtian sense which entails a complex, yet clear definition, of violence. 
According to Arendt, anyone who thinks about history and politics is conscious of the 
enormous role violence has always played in human affairs. Notwithstanding this 
significant role it is surprising that, on the one hand, violence has seldom been chosen 
for special consideration. She says: “violence and its arbitrariness were taken for 
granted and thus neglected; after all, no one doubts, or examines for that matter, what 
is obvious to all” (Arendt, 1970).  
And on the other hand, many have found the practice of violence and the 
complexity associated with it fascinating, so much so that it has been argued that 
violence “binds men together as a whole, since each individual forms a violent link in 
the great chain” (Fanon, 1968). However, such a bond should not be mistaken for 
power. Arendt has contended that this sort of brotherhood has “misled many good 
people into the hope that a new community together with a ‘new man’, will arise out 
of it”(Arendt, 1970). 
The brotherhood or relations based on the means of violence are strong at 
the time of formation, since it is usually built under an ideological process, but as 
ideology is questioned, the bonds become rather weak. Comparing to Benjamin, it 
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could be said that the binding role of violence is related to law-making violence while 
in the next steps law-preserving violence is used to defeat rivals. 
According to Arendt the first step toward defining the concept of violence is to 
differentiate between violence and power. Although in common use these two words 
are sometimes used interchangeably, “violence” is indeed different from “power”. 
She draws a clear line among such terms as “power”, “strength”, “force”, “authority”, 
and “violence”, in order to distinguish the civil rights struggle from the pull towards 
destruction: “to use them as synonyms not only indicates a certain deafness to 
linguistic meanings, which would be serious enough, but it has also resulted in a kind 
of blindness to the realities they correspond to.” (Arendt, 1970)  
The roots of such differentiation can be looked for in the way she analyzes the 
political space which is characterized by action and speech (Arendt, 1959). As for the 
relationship between language and violence, Arendt states: the point here is that 
violence itself is incapable of speech, and not merely that speech is helpless when 
confronted with violence. Because of this speechlessness political theory has little to 
say about the phenomenon of violence and must leave its discussion to the technicians 
(Arendt, 1963).  
Arendt explains that power “corresponds to the human ability not just to act 
but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a 
group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together” (Arendt, 
1970). Hence, power relies on numbers and cannot occur in the absence of plurality. 
Power is not a feature possessed by an individual, neither is it the capacity of one 
single person to take action in a certain way. To her power is always linked to groups 
of individuals. In this sense, power needs legitimacy which has its roots in consensus, 
an important point that will be thoroughly dealt with shortly. Expression of collective 
will is what Arendt describes as power. In this sense power does not need any 
guidance or justification; rather it emerges naturally because it is an end. 
On the contrary, violence does not depend on numbers, plurality, freedom, or 
consensus; rather “up to a point” it “can manage without them because it relies on 
implements.” Therefore, in relation to power and politics, violence “is distinguished 
by its instrumental character.” It is a means to an end, not an end in itself. And since 
violence is a phenomenon that usually draws condemnation, it “always stands in need 
of guidance and justification by something else.” 
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Violence can surely destroy power. To be more exact, one can say that 
violence has the ability to demolish the source of power (numbers) and plurality in the 
public-political realm, because its instruments allow the destruction of numbers 
(people) both physically and morally. But power can never emerge from violence. 
“That violence obstructs subjects’ bodily motion. It silences them as well.” To destroy 
freedom and speech, violence cannot be a political action.  In other words, “to be 
political, to live in polis, meant that everything was decided through words and 
persuasion and not through force and violence” (Arendt, 1959). 
Moreover, she contends that most political theorists seem to agree that 
violence is a blatant exercise of power, and that politics pursue power to exercise 
legitimate violence. A line, however, should be drawn between power and violence. 
But even those few who do so, still look at power as offspring of violence, though 
somewhat milder than the raving gunman or nation that goes on a rampage. Arendt 
says the fact that “power” and “violence” are held to be synonyms is rooted in the 
same function they share: they indicate the means by which man rules over fellow 
man. But they appear in their diversity, if one stops considering public life as a 
business of dominion of one or some over others/many (Arendt, 1970). 
The notion that power is the same as violence waiting for the right moment to 
make its presence felt is in line with political arguments that favor the absolute right 
of monarchies, the rule of oligarchies, the rule of aristocrats or democrats, or the rule 
of bureaucracy which in essence amounts to the rule of nobody. In bureaucracy which 
is a necessity of the modern world, that is both crowded and wealthy, there is no one 
to take your complaints to. Bureaucracy constitutes tyranny in the absence of a 
personal tyrant. When bureaucracy stops someone from acting, the human condition 
is thwarted. Arendt states that humans require a new model for political involvement 
in order to avoid becoming obedient, unthinking automatons. This new approach will 
not make violence its archetype. That freedom of action is foiled in modern societies 
amounts to glorification of violence in the modern world. Our societies have become 
immense in size and dysfunctional. Public services are under a lot of strain and public 
needs remain unmet. The very size of modern societies makes them fall apart. In fact, 
regardless of who is in charge, there is a common desire in all societies to resort to 
violence in a legitimate form (Arendt, 1959). 
Hannah Arendt doesn’t seem to be of the opinion that violence is completely 
useless in the context of political action. Arendt believes that violence could at times 
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be justified as a means to achieve just ends, ends which are significant in politics 
(Finlay, 2009). In other words, instrumental justification seems to be a key criterion 
for Arendt. 
Arendt’s focus on these themes accounts for one of the contexts in which she 
makes her case for the need to instrumentally justify violence. As far as morality is 
concerned, Arendt says that violence “can be justifiable, but it never will be 
legitimate. Its justification loses in plausibility the farther its intended end recedes into 
the future” (Arendt, 1969:52). Similarly, it is the violence’s conduciveness to 
achieving just ends that accounts for its rationality. ‘Violence, being instrumental by 
nature’, she writes, “is rational to the extent that it is effective in reaching the end that 
must justify it. And since when we act we never know with any certainty the eventual 
consequences of what we are doing, violence can remain rational only if it pursues 
short-term goals” (Arendt, 1970). 
In determining a correct criterion for justification, Arendt contrasts 
instrumentality with two principles which are erroneously used in revolutionary 
literature. ‘Legitimacy’ theories unfoundedly invoke the subjective origins of violence 
as proof of its justifiability. For Arendt, however, legitimacy belongs to power and the 
solidarities through which it makes its presence felt in the world: ‘Power’ which 
‘comes up when people get together and act in concert . . . gets its legitimacy from the 
initial get-together rather than from any potential action that ensues.’ Thus, ‘an appeal 
to the past’ will be needed to meet a challenge to legitimacy (Finlay, 2009). 
By contrast, the goal-centered nature of violence looks for validation in ‘an 
end that lies in the future. That is what Arendt describes as ‘justification’ (Arendt, 
1970).  The second error is to look at violence as valuable without making any 
reference either to its origins or ends. Here is what Arendt says in the preface to On 
Revolution: a theory of war or a theory of revolution . . . can only deal with the 
justification of violence because the justification constitutes its political limitation; if, 
instead, it arrives at a glorification or justification of violence as such, it is no longer 
political but anti-political (Arendt, 1970). 
According to Arendt, a lack of power always translates into a spike in 
violence. Achievement of an end lends rationality to acts of violence. Because we can 
seldom predict the implications of our actions over the long run, all violence should 
be meant to secure short-term goals. Violence can be a means to promote wrongs. But 
certain risks overshadow the use of violence which can overwhelm the users’ short-
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term goals. If violence persists after that preliminary quick strike, it can transform the 
politics into customary violence. And if violence is unsuccessful in serving its original 
purpose, efforts to return to the status quo are bound to fail. Contributing to the 
emergence of a world that is more violent in nature is the most likely outcome of 
using violence to achieve one’s ends. 
 
2-­‐5.	  Zizek;	  subjective,	  objective	  and	  systemic	  violence	  
 
When we think of something as violent, we gauge it by a presupposed set of 
standards in a “normal” non-violent situation and the highest form of violence comes 
as a result of imposing such standards with reference to which some events appear to 
be “violent”. Zizek understands the term ‘violence’ to commonly mean whatever is 
experienced as a violent intrusion (Zizek, 2008).  
In other words, he believes the common understanding of violence is closely 
related to the subjective form of violence or prima facie which is the most visible 
form of violence including inter-personal violence, criminality, terrorism, and 
international conflict. In such violence there is an easily identifiable agent such as a 
criminal, a terrorist, a policeman, a soldier… any individual. Subjective violence is 
the kind of violence that erupts right before our eyes. Subjective violence is the most 
visible form of violence, because it is measured by a neutral standard. In fact, 
subjective violence is corresponding with illegitimate violence. 
On the other hand, there is objective, which is the neutral standard against 
which the subjective act seems “violent”. Objective violence is the invisible form of 
violence that manifests itself either in a symbolic form which appears, among other 
things, in language, or in a systemic form (Packman and Writer). The notion that 
objective violence is not there to be seen helps us perceive something as subjectively 
violent. 
In addition, Zizek describes systemic violence as “the often catastrophic 
consequences of the smooth functioning of our economic and political systems” 
(Zizek, 2008). Systemic violence refers to social, political and economic forces that 
are needed to sustain things so that they can carry on ‘as normal’. In other words, the 
existence of such violence is imperative in order to reproduce the status quo and its 
social structures. The smooth functioning of the police force and that of the criminal 
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justice system and market forces, etc. adds up to prima facie, systemic violence. It is 
not the apprehensible violence we experience in our everyday lives. To elaborate on 
this, Zizek tells a joke about a suspected thief. Every evening, as a worker leaves a 
factory he works in, the wheelbarrow he rolls out of the facility is carefully inspected. 
The guards found nothing, it was always empty. Guards finally find out what the 
worker is stealing are the wheelbarrows themselves. Zizek contends that the same 
applies to systemic and subjective violence. Systemic violence and subjective 
violence cannot be looked at through the same standpoint. Systemic violence is 
“something like the notorious ‘dark matter’ of physics” as Zizek puts it; it is “the 
counterpart to an all-too-visible subjective violence” (Zizek, 2008). Normally it can’t 
be seen, because it sustains the very zero-level standard against which we think of 
something as subjectively violent. Therefore systemic violence must be taken into 
consideration in making sense of what otherwise seem to be ‘irrational’ 
manifestations of subjective violence (Zizek, 2008). 
Zizek states that he wants to develop an insight into violence as a phenomenon 
rather than merely making others heap moral scorn on it. In fact, the victims of 
violence – particularly extreme cases of violence such as the Holocaust – are unable 
to analyze the phenomenon, because they are traumatically involved in it (Zizek, 
2008). Zizek refuses the argument which labels violence as an urgent matter which 
demands immediate action rather than contemplation on the part of intellectuals. 
Therefore, it is always necessary to think and develop prior understanding before 
taking action. He believes the main threat does not lie in passivity, but in pseudo-
activity which only validates things as they are. In Zizek’s words, “sometimes, doing 
nothing is the most violent things to do” (Zizek, 2008). 
According to this classification, Zizek contends that the argument that focuses 
on the urgency of violence is a new trap set by systemic violence. During his study of 
violence Zizek has identified a new stratum of Capitalist rationale which has been 
ironically labeled as “liberal communism” by a group of entrepreneurs. They call the 
new trend the smart, creative and frictionless capitalist. While Capitalism represents 
one of the most important forms of systemic violence within contemporary societies 
(Zizek, 2008), this new trend tries to add a sense of urgency to violence and get 
involved in solving the problems through humanitarian and charitable activities. But, 
what is important here for Zizek is that Capitalism still sticks to its underlying logic: 
the ruthless pursuit of profit. Introduction of a charitable element into this equation is 
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designed to paper over the truth, appease guilt or, at least to be perceived as appeasing 
guilt. Furthermore, it is quite clear how this functions as “objective violence” and how 
the charitable element of capitalism creates the perfect red herring for the systemic 
violence. 
They set a philanthropic standard for themselves by which they desire to be 
gauged, whereas the more appropriate criterion to look at them is their concealed 
function in Capitalist exploitation. For example, when their philanthropy is contrasted 
to a street robber, it is crystal clear who the violent criminal is, but when we start to 
analyze the thing which is not readily perceptible – objective violence – we develop 
an understanding of their violent criminality at another level which is camouflaged by 
philanthropy (Packman and Writer). 
What Zizek concludes about violence is that it is often the case in which 
nations and individuals do not properly analyze the violent situation surrounding 
them. Consequently we could be tilting at windmills at a time when we have no idea 
who we are fighting or what we think we might achieve from it. Zizek’s radical 
solution to this problem is to sit tight and do nothing. He claims “better to do nothing 
than to contribute to the invention of formal ways of rendering visible that which 
Empire already recognizes as existent”. Today’s threat emanates from those who need 
to appear to be “active” on the surface in order to hide a deeper level of violence, 
apropos the “liberal communists”. Because such violence is so well concealed, for 




This chapter has sought to define what I mean by the term “legitimized 
violence”. To define the concept of legitimized violence we are faced with a 
combination of two concepts that their common denominator is vagueness and 
ambiguity in different aspects. Violence with its multifaceted, socially constructed 
and highly- ambivalent characteristics defies definition. As a result of mentioned 
elements, violence, in this study, is considered as something to do with a change in 
the “normal” state of affairs.  
According to the definition of violence it is inevitable to consider this concept 
from a political perspective and explain its relation to power. In fact, what is the 
	   26	  
“normal state” and who defines this situation can tie the concept of violence to 
politics. Modern political philosophy is born out from this nexus, in what extent that it 
could be said violence and political power in modernity are mutually constitutive 
concepts. However, Modern societies seem to be inevitably haunted by a paradoxical 
situation, in which violence threatens the legitimacy of the political order it helps 
sustain. 
To explain this puzzling situation, I borrowed Benjamin’s classification of 
violence in which he ascribes the relation between politics and violence to the realm 
of law. According to Benjamin we are faced with two kinds of violence whereby 
political orders establish and continue; law making violence and law preserving 
violence. Benjamin calls these two forms of violence “mythic violence” because their 
intrinsic dialectic leads into an inescapable and circular logic: any law-destroying 
act results in a new positing of law which again violently tries to preserve itself. The 
origin of this mythical characteristic of violence would be discussed in relation to 
sovereignty in the next chapter. 
In addition, I have employed the term “justification”, from Arendt, to explain 
how violence  could sometimes be justified as the means for achieving just ends, ends 
which were important for politics. In other words, violence can be justified, and not 
legitimized, in its law making process because of origination from plurality and 
action. But if violence lingers after the initial quick strike, it can change the 
political environment to habitual violence; the situation we are experienced through a 
systemic violence through law preserving violence. 
Accordingly, we haven’t properly analyzed the violent situation with which 
we might be situated. In fact, the violent situation is considered for granted by a 
complicated bureaucracy managed with liberal communist who are trying to put 
urgency on violence and be involved in solving the problems through humanitarian 






	   27	  
Chapter	  three:	  The	  Dilemma	  of	  Sovereignty	  	  
 
3-­‐1.	  Sovereignty;	  a	  multifaceted	  concept:	  
	  
The concept of sovereignty is a constant in political thoughts, one that gives 
shape to our understanding of the relationship between the governing and the 
governed. Although sovereignty has a permanent presence in theoretical discussions 
as well as in forming traits in social relations, it is not meant to be an explicit concept. 
In other words, sovereignty, as a building block of modern states, is one of the most 
thoroughly discussed concepts in political thoughts. However, vagueness remains the 
only point about sovereignty around which there is consensus. “There exists perhaps 
no conception the meaning of which is more controversial than that of sovereignty. It 
is an indisputable fact that this conception – from the moment when it was introduced 
into political science until the present day – has never had a meaning, which was 
universally agreed upon”, Oppenheim said (Nagan and Hammer, 2003).   
Nothing produces better testimony to the success of political modernity than the 
almost universal recognition of sovereignty – both in the past and today – as being 
vital to understanding political power. According to this fact, even today, after the 
emergence of globalization literature, a viable alternative vocabulary for political 
thinking is conspicuous by its absence (Jennings, 2011b). That is to say, sovereignty 
is a concept for which there are several uses and as many definitions. After all, 
discourses and practices surrounding sovereignty have created the necessary logic and 
justification for the political frameworks humans have invented, at least since the 
dawn of Modernity (Bartelson, 1995).  
Although Jean Bodin’s theory about sovereignty is regarded as a first 
systematic step toward laying down the concept and function of sovereignty, the 
origin of theorizing on sovereignty can be traced back to Aristotle’s Politics in which 
sovereignty is identified as an existing supreme power in the state that may be in the 
hands of one, a few, or many (Aristotle, 1999). In the 12th and 13th centuries AD, the 
struggle between Church and State saw the fundamental propositions of the theory of 
sovereignty flourish. Consequently, the notion of government based on the consent of 
the governed emerged. However, in the predominant theory of the Middle Ages, 
people were viewed as nothing more than a mass of subjects (C. E. Merriam, 2001). 
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Jean Bodin defined sovereignty in favor of a strong central control of a 
national monarchy in the 16th century. Sovereignty, in his definition, is “the absolute 
and perpetual power of a commonwealth”. In a later Latin edition of his theory, 
sovereignty is defined as “the supreme power over citizens and subjects, unrestrained 
by law” (Bodin, 2001). In fact, this definition became the framer of the theory of 
sovereignty upon which modern political theory has been built. 
Bodin’s definition of sovereignty features three characteristics: absoluteness, 
perpetuity and indivisibility. Hence, he has depicted an image of sovereignty that is 
free from obligation to any and all laws. On the contrary, however, he states that the 
laws of God, of nature, and of nations amount to restrictions on every ruler. But in 
practice, all these limitations are more ethical than political in character, and could at 
best bind only the conscience of the ruler (Merriam, 2001), which, according to 
historical facts, cannot be trusted. 
However, he regards the law as the source of power, and in the same breath 
views a prince as being above the law, one who is not subject to his own decisions or 
decrees. Given that Bodin’s theory gives the king the role of the sole legislator, his 
sovereignty is totally exclusive (Benoist, 1999). It is an exclusiveness which is 
transitioned from the divine absolutism to the royal absolutism. He replaces God’s 
monopolistic and absolute sovereignty by monopolistic and absolute sovereignty of 
the state. Such replacement confirms Carl Schmitt’s theory, that would be discussed 
late  which states “All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are 
secularized theological concepts” (Schmitt, 1985). 
While Bodin constructed the state of absoluteness, Thomas Hobbes introduced 
the most through argument for absolutism ever in Leviathan. He depicted an 
anarchical condition, state of nature, in which a war of all against all prevailed. To 
end this chaos, eventually individuals decide to enter society and place themselves 
under the authority of a prince. Although Hobbes hypothesized a social contract based 
on the rationality of individuals and the consent of the governed, in his theory security 
comes at a price and that is obedience. So in the Arendtian point of view , sovereignty 
is placed in opposition to the concept of politics. Obedience is a concept which is 
related to the sphere of violence rather than to politics. 
Furthermore, sovereignty and its subjects are created simultaneously (C. E. 
Merriam, 2001). Therefore, the concept of people is born as a result of a contract, and 
sovereignty cannot be delegated or alienated by people who do not exist until 
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sovereignty is created (C. E. Merriam, 2001). In other words, individuals are not 
naturally subjects of the law and only after conclusion of a contract they are viewed as 
bearers of a right. So the real consequences of sovereignty manifest themselves in 
practice. In other words, sovereignty is both an abstract concept in political theories 
and a wide range of practices which lead to the production and legitimization of 
authority. Thus, states or other forms of authority must produce and reproduce their 
sovereignty, in part through convincing others – their citizens, other states, and global 
institutions – of the existence and legitimacy their sovereignty (Shaw, 2008). This 
process of producing authority has continued long enough for sovereignty and 
sovereign states to be viewed as natural and inevitable factors in human life through 
which the world must be articulated and convinced. (Shaw, 2008). 
The central role of sovereignty in defining the state is clear in Max Weber’s 
works more than any other scholar’s. In Politics as a Vocation, Weber defines a state 
by its means as opposed to its ends. He says “every State is based on force” (Weber, 
1964). However, force is not the sole building block of a State; Weber contends that 
force must be legitimate for pragmatic as well as normative reasons alike. 
Weber describes the state as “a relationship of rule (Herrschaft) by human 
beings over human beings, and one that rests on the legitimate use of violence (that is, 
violence that is held to be legitimate)” (Weber, 1994). He believes there are three 
forms of legitimacy as far as the monopoly of force is concerned; the first one is the 
authority of the eternal past, the second authority is charisma and the third Weberian 
category of legitimacy covers rationally-devised rules, rule by virtue of legality and 
belief in the validity of legal statute and the appropriate juridical competence. 
In locating legitimacy in the rule by consented-to leaders and the law which 
constitute custom, Weber’s definition of the state suggests that it is the use of a now 
legitimized monopoly on violence that helps realize the now legitimated ends of 
society. Hence he claims “the state is the form of human community that 
(successfully) lays claim to the monopoly on legitimate physical violence” (Weber, 
1964). In the modern state, the powers to wield legitimate force, ideally, depend 
exclusively on the legality of the authority of a democratically elected political 
leadership. In other words, the modern state is the only player on the political front 
which monopolizes violence. Tilly builds on the same assumption to label state-
making as organized crime. In fact, sovereignty paves the way for legitimized 
violence. 
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The revolutionary tradition’s view of politics was taken up in the 20th century 
and passed down to the contemporary critique of sovereignty. But the only thing that 
contemporary critiques of sovereignty do is to echo the earlier conceptual vocabulary 
and logic. Consequently they contribute to the naturalization of the modernist self-
description of political life. However, recent years have seen a remarkably under-
theorized paradigm shift in critical thought, and as a result sovereignty seems to have 
emerged as the concept of our time. Indeed, as far as critical scholarship is concerned, 
in the past 15 years the question of sovereignty has gone from a specially-provocative 
curiosity question to its very conceptual core (Jennings, 2011b).  
Indeed, critical thoughts on sovereignty have tried to expound on the way that 
sovereignty, both as a political practice and a theoretical notion, has turned out to be 
very resilient and almost impossible to do without. In order to better grasp the 
theoretical foundation of sovereignty as a legitimizer of violence and tie its function 
to our definition of legitimized violence, it would be worthy to lead off with Carl 
Schmitt because a host of modern theorists of sovereignty like Agamben have 
oriented themselves to two epigrammatic texts by Carl Schmitt, although it could not 
be considered a merely critical theory on sovereignty at all. 
 
3-­‐2.	  Carl	  Schmitt;	  antagonism	  and	  decision	  
 
As a first step to define the concept of sovereignty, Schmitt rejects as fictitious 
claims about the hermetic legal system. Instead, he argues that political life is defined 
in its essence – not by laws, rather by the categorical fact that the possibility of 
violence in life can never be ruled out. Schmitt believes that at some point in time 
every community must face the challenge posed by some force, either external or 
internal, that seeks to decimate it. At that moment, the response most people and 
communities produce is inadequate, but someone or some group, will take a defensive 
stand against the other side that they call the enemy (Jennings, 2011a). In The 
Concept of the Political, Schmitt describes as sovereignty the necessity of making a 
distinction between friends and enemies in the face of the ever-present possibility of 
violence. Hence, “The political,” friend-enemy relationship lies at the heart of politics 
(Scmitt, 2007). This distinction is similar to those made in other areas, including ugly 
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and beautiful in esthetics and good and evil in ethics; but it cannot be reduced to 
those.  
Schmitt says the sovereign “is he who decides about the exception” (Schmitt, 
1985). This definition should not be viewed as being tantamount to the suspension of 
existing legal order. Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty consists of two key elements 
required if one seeks to develop a correct understanding of his theory. The first factor 
is decision which means a true sovereign decision that is never subsumed under any 
rule or norm, because, in essence, it amounts to their ultimate origin. In other words, 
the instituting sovereign decision cannot be reduced or traced back to anything 
external to itself (Kalyvas, 2000). Therefore, the essence of sovereignty for Schmitt is 
its power to create new constitutions. Furthermore, the sovereign is not only the 
constituent subject, but the reflection of the will of people. In other words, the 
sovereign is one with the authority to make a total decision on the type and form of 
political existence, which amounts to determining the existence of a political unity in 
its entirety (Kalyvas, 2000). So, for Schmitt, a constitution is democratic only when it 
has its roots in the direct and immediate expression of the constituent power of the 
popular sovereign will; this may seem more populistic than democratic, though. 
It should be noted that the decision on the state of exception is always made in 
a historico-political context. It is pre-normative, but it is always made in a situation of 
concrete disorder and there is no external arrangement that could provide predictions 
about its outcome. A decision in this sense amounts to embracing the contingency 
constituent for the political, however, as Giacommo Marramao rightly points out “the 
decision is not a coup de theatre - a mere arbitrary gesture for its own ends, art pour 
l'art - but the cut, the innovative schism, which is the origin of every concrete, 
actually existing legal system” (Marramao, 2000). 
The fact that historico-political circumstances are concrete puts a limit on the 
extent of arbitrariness on the part of the sovereign creator. The decision is sovereign 
because it is an ultimate act of establishing the new order, an act which cannot be 
judged by any existing norm, because it creates those norms. In an era that follows the 
French Revolution, people, not as a collection of individuals but rather the self-
conscious collective will, are the only legitimate sovereign (Schmitt, 2008).  
Under this definition, although the sovereign is defined as the constituent 
subject who is not above the law, the exception which is a second factor could set the 
stage for the sovereign to act and make decisions outside the confines of the law. The 
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exception, then, is the condition of the possibility of sovereignty and not its essence. 
Indeed, the exception is a moment of crisis. Renato Cristi quotes Schmitt as saying 
that “sovereignty became visible only during exceptional circumstances, when a 
constitution was destroyed and another was born. In these circumstances, sovereignty 
showed up under the guise of constituent power” (Cristi, 1998). The sovereign subject 
therefore ignores the law, simply to make the ‘instauration’ of a new one possible. 
The sovereign will of the people is not above the law; it is below the law and its 
origin indeed. 
The kind of relation between the exception and the sovereign suggests that if 
the sovereign makes a creative decision to define what law is, it cannot be rescinded 
once the decision is made (Kalyvas, 2000). Therefore, the sovereign subject remains 
both below and next to the constituted power at the same time. And in today’s 
regulated life the constituted powers is unfavorable thanks to rules, procedures, and 
instituted mechanisms. In fact, the popular power that lies at the center of the 
constitution and the democratic legitimacy it wields is dismissed as a perilous 
prejudice, a myth, or an unpleasant factual datum, while constituted power takes 
center stage in political theory (Kalyvas, 2000). 
For Schmitt “it is the essence of sovereignty both to decide what is an 
exception and to make the decisions appropriate to that exception” (B.Strong, 2011). 
It is here that the complexity of this apparently simple and straightforward truth 
comes to light. The question is what is it that enables the sovereign to decide on the 
exception and thus be sovereign?  
 
3-­‐3.	  Foucault;	  sovereign	  power	  and	  body	  
 
Foucault considers sovereignty as a key theoretical obstacle he wants to 
overcome in his analysis. And he regards the task at hand as urgent, since he believes 
the forms of power obscured by preoccupation with sovereignty are extremely 
essential to our understanding of contemporary societies. He once criticized his 
contemporaries by saying, “In political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off 
the head of the king” (Foucault, 1990).  
In a bid to deconstruct the concept of sovereignty, he suggests that over time 
the society of the past in which individuals were viewed as disciplinary bodies turned 
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into a society in which individuals were seen as an integral part of the population, 
statistically managed by a centralized power, and where mechanisms of reproduction 
and health control were at work. In other words, the old power which gave a 
sovereign the right “to kill and let live,” that is to say to have life and death of an 
individual at his/her will, was superseded by the modern biopower, a new concept 
which took over the right “to make live and let die,” i.e. regulate society by stressing 
the protection of life and welfare without explicitly threatening death. The foundation 
of such a society would be that wanton killing should come to an end and that the 
concept of war should become paradoxical (Radovanović, 2007). 
Based on Foucault’s claim, sovereign power is closely linked to the body of 
the King, a “double body” that consists of both the physical body of the actual 
sovereign, and an intangible, unchangeable body representative of the kingdom itself 
(Foucault, 1995).  In pre-modern society, laws were viewed to be a direct extension of 
the will of the sovereign, so breaking those laws amounted to not only violating the 
immediate victim, but personally taking on the sovereign himself. According to 
Foucault, sovereign power was centered on the King’s right to seize everything - 
including the lives of citizens whenever they directly threatened his authority.  This 
“seizure,” Foucault asserted, was to be made in public. Therefore punishment was the 
most obvious manifestation of a sovereign’s power; a clear act through which the 
sovereign exacted penalties in order to draw his people’s attention to “the 
dissymmetry between the subject who has dared to violate the law and the all-
powerful sovereign who displayed his strength” (Foucault, 1995). 
Therefore, public torture was basically a theatrical performance whose goal 
was to provide, for public consumption, a physical showdown between the sovereign 
and the criminal. Foucault believes all sovereign acts of power were brutal and public 
in order to discourage future enemies from having designs on what the sovereign 
possessed. In light of the fact that even the smallest crime was regarded as a direct 
challenge to the power of the sovereign, he constantly sought to eliminate his 
enemies; foreign ones through long wars, and domestic ones through public execution 
(Hall, 2007). 
In other words, what the sovereign did was not meant to protect the land or the 
lives of the people who lived in the territory under his control. Rather, he simply acted 
to stand up for his ownership of his territory and his subjects, with priority given to 
territory rather than subjects (Foucault, 1994). 
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Though the sovereign was said to have unlimited, absolute power, Foucault 
described his right over life and death as a “strange right”. In other words, the 
sovereign’s power over both life and death was said to be equal; evidently he could 
not grant life in the way that he could take life and cause death. Thus Foucault 
concludes that there was an imbalance in the sovereign’s power over the body 
(Foucault, 2003). 
Accordingly the sovereign power was limited and on shaky ground. Hence, 
the 16th century authors tried to distance themselves from the conventional notion that 
sovereignty granted an absolute right to the sovereign by articulating what they called 
an “art of government”(Inda, 2005). 
This art of government sought to come to terms with the theory of sovereignty 
by trying to legitimize certain aspects of sovereign power through the concept of a 
social contract (Foucault, 1994). In fact, late-modern political criticism has lent an 
unfortunate advantage to normative theories of democracy and has made the concept 
of reason a pillar of both the project of modernity and the theme of sovereignty 
(Bohman and Rehg, 1997). 
In this paradigm, reason amounts to the truth of the subject and politics adds 
up to the exercise of reason in the public arena. The exercise of reason is equal to the 
exercise of freedom, a backbone of individual autonomy. The explanation of 
sovereignty, in this case, relies on the belief that the subject is the master and the 
controlling architect of his or her own meaning (Mbembe, 2003). Sovereignty is 
therefore defined as a two-way street involving self-institution and self-limitation. 
In light of the fact that politics is viewed as the work of death and sovereignty 
as the right to kill, biopower emerges as a key component in understanding Foucault. 
In his formulation, biopower functions through dividing people into two groups: those 
who must live and those who must die. Such a power, which operates on the basis of a 
division between the living and the dead, defines itself in relation to a biological field 
it takes control of and vests itself in. This control is based on the distribution of 
human species into groups, the subdivision of the population into subgroups, and the 
establishment of a biological interruption between one group and the others. This is 
what Foucault identifies as racism (Mbembe, 2003). 
The fact that race, or racism for that matter, has such a prominent place in 
biopower equations is quite justifiable. After all, race has been a more constant 
present in Western political thought and practice than class-thinking, an ideology that 
	   35	  
defines history as a struggle of classes for economic purposes. It is especially true 
when it comes to imagining the inhumanity of, or rule over, foreign peoples 
(Mbembe, 2003). 
According to Foucault, racism is mostly a technology designed to allow the 
exercise of biopower, “that old sovereign right of death”(Foucault, 2003). In the 
economy of biopower, the function of racism is to control the distribution of death 
and to make the murderous functions of the state possible. Foucault says biopower is 
“the condition for the acceptability of putting to death”(Foucault, 2003). He explicitly 
says that the sovereign right to kill (droit de glaive) and the mechanisms of biopower 
are part and parcel of the way all modern states function. In fact, they are the building 
blocks of state power in modernity. Therefore, biopower tends to regularize, some call 
it normalize, its subjects as members of a joint group of population. “The normalizing 
society is one in which the norms of discipline and regulation overlap along an 
orthogonal articulation”. So, the new power that emerges here takes monopoly both 
over body and life, which means over life in general (Foucault, 2003). 
Foucault believes Nazi Germany was a perfect example of a state exercising 
the right to kill. Such a state, he claims, made sure the management, protection, and 
cultivation of life was coextensive with the sovereign’s right to kill. 
 
3-­‐4.	  Agamben:	  the	  nexus	  of	  Schmitt	  and	  Foucault	  
 
Agamben’s point of view is applicable as one seeks an answer to the question 
about what enables the sovereign to decide on the exception and thus be sovereign. In 
a bid to overcome the vagueness blurring the relation between sovereign, exception 
and violence, Agamben turns to Schmitt in order to neutralize the empirical 
discontinuity which, according to Michel Foucault, modernity has introduced by 
politicizing the biological framework of life. He believes sovereignty is precisely a 
function that blurs the distinction between keeping alive and putting to death, just as it 
eliminates the distinction between right and violence, value and fact. Sovereignty is a 
condition for political life, and it is the sovereign who grants subjects their right to 
living because he has already banished their lives to death (Luisetti, 2011). 
Following one of his favorite source essays, Walter Benjamin’s “Critics on 
Violence”, Agamben views the relation between constituent power and constituted 
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power as relation between the violence that posits law and the violence that preserves 
it (Neilson, 2004). For Agamben, constituent power “posses no title that might 
legitimate something other than law-preserving violence and even maintains as 
ambiguous and ineradicable relation with constituted power (Agamben, 1998). 
Agamben starts off with the notion that the exception is the primary relation of 
the entire Western paradigm of politics. He explains that the Greek drew a line 
between the simple fact of living – zoe – and the qualified political law – bios. He 
states that this version of politics turns canonical for modern humans, centering on 
rival articulation of the good life (Agamben, 1998). 
Agamben then builds on Foucault’s distinction between this classical 
paradigm and the introduction of a distinctively modern “biopolitics”, in which 
biological life of both the individual and the species turns into what is on the line in 
politics. He contends that in the process of transition from the classical to the 
biopolitical paradigm, the “bare life” that was set aside from politics and the polis as 
an unqualified fact of living is placed in the field of politics. He also argues that the 
original exclusion of “bare life” from political life amounts to what he describes as an 
“inclusive exclusion” (Neal, 2007). 
According to Agamben, the existence of modern Western subject does not 
simply come in opposition to sovereign political authority, but is built on an originally 
sovereign relation. For Agamben, sovereign exceptionalism is not simply an 
oppressive abuse of what should otherwise be a balanced link between liberty and 
security, subject and sovereign. Rather, exceptionalism lies at the heart of sovereignty 
itself (Neal, 2007). 
In fact, Agamben regards the state of exception as a modern institution which 
has its roots in the French revolution. Initially, Agamben names two main schools of 
thought in connection with the legality of the state of exception. The first sees it as ‘an 
intrinsic part of positive law because the necessity that grounds it is an autonomous 
source of law’ (Agamben, 2005). In international law today this approach is codified 
based on the notion of derogation. When faced with a public emergency that 
‘threatens the life of a nation’, international human rights deals – and many 
constitutions – give the states the go-ahead to put the protection of certain basic rights 
on hold. The existence of derogation-like clauses is often presented as a ‘concession’ 
to the ‘inevitability’ of exceptional state measures in emergencies, and also as a 
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means to bring these emergencies under control. As such, they are considered ‘one of 
the greatest achievements of contemporary international law’ (Humphreys, 2006).  
In practice, the derogation model ‘creates a gap between fundamental rights 
and the rule of law’, in which states can remain lawful while violating individual 
rights. In effect, this creates what Tom Hickman describes as a ‘double-layered 
constitutional system’ (Hickman, 2005). 
Agamben’s second group looks at the state of exception as ‘essentially 
extrajuridical’, something that comes before law or something totally different from 
law. For these writers, a constitutional approval of the state of exception amounts to a 
pragmatic recognition of limited constitutional dominion. Echoing Alexander 
Hamilton, that ‘the circumstances that put the safety of nations at risk are infinite; and 
for this reason no constitutional limits can wisely be slapped on the power to which 
the care of it is committed’ (Agamben, 2005), supporters say that it is neither possible 
nor desirable to use standard judicial accountability mechanisms to curb executive 
action in times of emergency (Gross, 2003).  
A legal space must instead be created for unlimited state action, although only 
for the time it takes to restore constitutional order. Attempts to impose legal controls 
will simply infect ordinary rights protections with extraordinary elasticity. But 
Agamben rejects both approaches – ‘In relations to the juridical order, the state of 
exception is neither internal nor external, and the problem of defining it has to do with 
a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not leave each 
other out, but rather blur one another’. ‘How can an anomie be inscribed within the 
juridical order?’ he wonders (Agamben, 2005). 
Therefore, Agamben argues that sovereignty is defined by a “state of 
exception” wherein a sovereign, whose position is defined, paradoxically – by being 
both inside and outside the law – can put on hold the normal juridical framework and 
the legal limits and protection that are enshrined it (Newman, 2004). 
For Agamben the state of exception is not so exceptional. Rather its 
immanence and its existence as an all-present possibility under the modern state have 
turned it into a predominant political form in liberal democracies and authoritarian 
countries alike. It gets even worse because the aggrandizement of state sovereign 
power imposing a permanent state of exception, despite the etymological paradox 
associated with such a condition, leads to a decline in the number of the members of 
society from citizenship, from legally protected social belonging associated with 
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human or civil rights, to humans denied all legal protection, all rights, and 
dispossessed of societal membership (Colatrella, 2011). Thus comes their reduction, 
based on a concept from Hannah Arendt, to “bare life”, to mere physical existence 
whose precariousness is exposed to the whim of either state power or even the 
animosity of neighbors who may decide that their existence could turn out to be 
inconvenient or undesirable. In the absence of any restraint on state power’s ability to 
impose a state of exception, various parts of the contemporary population, and 
potentially all of us, are in danger of being reduced to this condition of bare life, 
which Agamben describes as Homo Sacer, a juridical figure in Ancient Rome, 
someone who could not be sacrificed in religious ceremonies, but who could be killed 
by anyone with impunity (Agamben, 1998). In other words, he is totally stripped of 
any legal status, cultural or social value, or societal membership that has to be 
recognized by others. 
He renews the concept of bare life based on the description of Hannah Arendt, 
who in the Origins of Totalitarianism used the phrase “the abstract nakedness of being 
human” (Arendt, 1958) to refer to the condition of refugees in Central Europe after 
World War II. 
For Agamben, this reality is taken even further – into the relation of the citizen 
to the nation state itself. Refugees or people who are politically dispossessed and 
without a country are not the only ones whose lives are on the line, all of us are in 
danger. At any moment the state we think we belong to could become aggressive, 
declare a state of exception and suspend or throw out some or all of our rights and 
liberties. We are all exposed. Certainly some groups find themselves in this condition 
sooner than others or more fully than others. But as they say they are the canaries in 
the coalmine, it is only a matter of fiat or of time before we get together. The 
concentration camp resident or the Jew in Nazi Germany becomes the paradigmatic 
individual for the modern person, who is reduced at least potentially at all times to 
homo sacer – to bare life as Arendt puts it, to someone whose legal, citizenship, even 
cultural belonging are taken away, a juridically deracinated human awaiting his/her 
fate at the hands of those who can do as they please, and with impunity (Colatrella, 
2011). 
By juxtaposing these concepts, the sovereign state of exception and the bare 
life of Homo Sacer, Agamben shows the relationship between the top and bottom of 
the Schmittian political hierarchy. He aims to warn us and to demonstrate to us that 
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under conditions of the modern state none of us is safe. In other words, Agamben 
wants to expound on the present danger to civil liberties, the danger of special powers 
wielded by governments declaring states of emergency, the increasingly common turn 
to “delegated democracy” through authoritarian methods by only formally elected 





In this chapter I have discussed on the definition of sovereignty and its role in 
legitimizing violence. I have outlined the importance of sovereignty in political 
modernity where the concept of sovereignty has been accepted as the sole important 
term for comprehending political power to what extent that we are without a viable 
alternative vocabulary for thinking politically. 
To elaborate the nexus between sovereignty and violence, I started by 
Schmitt’s theory in which the sovereign “is he who decides about the exception”. In 
other words, sovereign defines the “normal state” and conceals itself behind this 
accepted normal situation and became visible only during exceptional circumstances. 
I have explained what enables the sovereign to decide on the exception by 
borrowing the term “biopower” from Foucault. He deconstructs the concept of 
sovereign power and its close connection to the body of the King which is 
transformed to legitimize sovereignty through social contract. According to him, 
sovereign right to kill and the mechanisms of biopower, categorization of people, are 
constitutive elements of state power in modernity. 
I have tried to illustrate the nexus between state of exception and biopower 
through Agamben’s point of view. According to Agamben, the exception is the 
original relation of the entire Western paradigm of politics. Regarding this 
assumption, state of exception is a modern institution and exceptionalism is the very 
structure of sovereignty itself. In fact, state of exception is a possibility always under 
the modern state has now led to it becoming the predominant political form in liberal 
democratic countries as well as authoritarian ones. To examine his assumption, the 
concept of camp would be discussed in the next chapter.   
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Nothing is as effective as the picture Arendt paints in demonstrating the 
horrible experience Nazi concentration camps imposed on humanity. Says Hannah 
Arendt: “There are no parallels to the life in the concentration camps. Its horror can 
never be fully embraced by the imagination for the very reason that it stands out of 
life and death” (Arendt, 1958). As a result of that horrifying experience, the 
mainstream post-war political line of thinking, that is to say Western Liberal 
Democracy, has sought to prove that it is impossible to allow a repeat of the horrible 
experience of World War II, citing the fact that such an incident would be irreparable. 
As an instance, The Boy in the Striped Pajamas, a book for children and 
young people about the Final Solution and the Holocaust, closes with a deliberately 
comforting and reassuring message to its intended young readers: “and that’s the end 
of the story about Bruno and his family. Of course all this happened a long time ago 
and nothing like that could ever happen again. Not in this day and age” (Boyne, 
2006). 
According to this mainstream ideology, the state of exception is mostly 
dissected in relation to Nazism, totalitarianism and concentration camps. And 
concentration camps have been depicted as metaphors for the rule of violence which 
has its roots in absolute power (Mbembe, 2003). In fact, in bid to somehow mask the 
modern government the mainstream has tried to connect the establishment of these 
camps to the violence that prevails inside them. In other words, the inherent violence 
of the modern government which is in fact one of its building blocks has been 
downplayed as a preventable slip. 
Unlike the mainstream, some analysts have drawn on historical perspectives to 
suggest that concentration camps are not rooted in Fascism, but rather they are built 
on a colonial, imperialistic foundation on one hand, and on serialization of technical 
mechanisms to kill, on the other. (Mbembe, 2003).  
A research by Enzo Traverso suggests that the death chambers of Nazis were a 
product of a prolonged inhuman process to industrialize death. (the factory, the 
bureaucracy, the prison, the army). The serialized, mechanical killing turned into a 
swift, silent, impersonal and purely technical trend. In certain areas the shift in 
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question was bolstered by racial stereotypes. Facilitated by some kind of class-based 
racism, it led to the identification of stateless people with slaves in colonies (Traverso, 
2003). 
Regarding this historical perspective, to Agamben concentration camps are not 
a mere historic relic. Inspired by Foucault in his analysis of prison, Agamben believes 
camps are in existence at the present time too. His analysis of the camp does not turn 
to memory archives. He tries to paint a more delicate picture of the political status 
quo by going through key substructures which are hidden from sight. To him, a 
concentration camp is not demarcated by walls; rather it symbolizes a line between 
political existence and bare life. In other words, camps are not merely the ones which 
were run by Nazis. In his thesis, the camp is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of 
modern Western societies (Agamben, 1998). In other word, the concept of camp in 
Agamben refers to an “event that repeats itself on a daily basis” (Panagia, 1999). In 
fact, analyzing the camp is a history of the present,  
He says, “The camp is the space that is opened when the state of exception 
begins to become the rule” (Agamben, 1998). According to this interpretation of 
camp, Bari Stadium where the Italian police hold illegal Albanian migrants before 
deporting them, a corner of a French airport where foreigners seeking asylum are 
questioned, and the island off the coast of Australia where foreign migrants and 
asylum-seekers are held have all same characteristics like Nazi concentration camps 
and forced labor Gulag in Soviet Union. 
In fact, in all these cases, an apparently innocuous space […] actually delimits 
a space in which the normal order is de facto suspended and in which whether or not 
atrocities are committed depends not on law but on the civility and ethical sense of the 
police who temporarily act as sovereign (Agamben, 1998). 
In the political-juridical structure of the camp, he adds, the state of exception 
ceases to be a temporal suspension of the state of law. According to Agamben, it 
acquires a permanent spatial arrangement that remains continually outside the normal 
state of law. Because its inhabitants are divested of political status and reduced to bare 
life, the camp is, for Giorgio Agamben, “the place in which the most absolute conditio 
inhumana ever to appear on Earth was realized” (Agamben, 2000).  
In other words, Agamben fundamentally changes the traditional understanding 
of “camp”. The camp that in the past was an expression of the difference between 
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friend and enemy, symbolizes, in Agamben’s work, the state of exception where law 
and fact, rule and exception overlap (Lemke, 2005).  
According to Agamben, modern biopolitics is “double-sided: the spaces, the 
liberties, and the rights won by individuals in their conflicts with central powers 
always simultaneously prepared a tacit but increasing inscription of individuals’ lives 
within the state order, thus offering a new and more dreadful foundation for the very 
sovereign power from which they wanted to liberate themselves” (Agamben, 1998). It 
is the same reference to “bare life” that in liberal democracies results in the pre-
eminence of the private over the public sphere, while in totalitarian states it becomes a 
decisive political criterion of the suspension of individual rights. But even if both 
forms of government rely on the same political substance – bare life – it does not 
necessarily mean that they are equal in normative terms. Rather, he wants to show 
that the democratic rule of law is by no means an alternative project to the Nazi 
regime or the Stalinist dictatorship, since the later radicalize biopolitical tendencies 
that according to Agamben could be found in various political contexts and historical 
epochs (Lemke, 2005). However, Agamben does not seek to downplay or ignore the 
fundamental differences that exist between democracy and Nazism; rather he wants to 
focus on what completely different forms of governance have in common. 
In addition, he claims that modernity is the biopolitical age par excellence, 
since it is only in modernity that exception and rule become ultimately 
indistinguishable (Lemke, 2005). After the end of Nazism and Stalinism a new era of 
biopolitics comes into being. There is no simple historic continuity between 
totalitarian regimes and democratic states; instead Agamben notes an increasing 
aggravation of biopolitics. According to him, “biopolitics has passed beyond a new 
threshold” […]: “in modern democracies it is possible to state in public what the Nazi 
biopoliticians did not dare to say” (Agamben, 1998). While the Nazi biopolitics 
concentrated on identifiable individuals or specific subpopulations, “in our age all 
citizens can be said, in a specific but extremely real sense, to appear virtually as 
homices sacri” (Agamben, 1998). He explains that the borders that drew distinction 
between individuals or social groups during Nazism and Stalinism, unleashing 
violence against them, have now moved to within individuals. In other words, in the 
modern world all citizens are potential subjects to be reduced to bare life.	   The line of 
separation between political existence and bare life “moved inside every human life 
and every citizen. Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite 
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category. It now dwells in the biological body of every living being” (Agamben, 
1998).  
In fact, the capacity of the sovereign to classify one as homo sacer is 
immanently possible for all. Thus, for Agamben, all citizens are subjected to the 
possibility of the sovereign ban and as a result all maintain a relationship to the space 
of the camp (Jamal and Sandor, 2010). In the eyes of Agamben, the emergence of 
camps comes in parallel with a new look at civic laws and the process of abolishing 
citizenship. In other words, creation of camps which is based on transformation and 
identity distinction is a modern form of an old process which centers on national 
identity, nation-building and citizenship. Thus, Exclusionary processes and the 
“othering” of difference are pivotal to the construction and manifestation of the 
nation, national identity and citizenship (Hall, 1997).  
The state of exception (the temporary suspension of the juridical-political 
order) becomes a new and longer-lasting spatial arrangement inhabited by the bare 
life that can no longer be inscribed in that order – the camp thus becomes the 
permanent space of exception and disjuncture between birth (bare life) and the nation-
state. The camp is manifested in a number of ways, from the most obvious – the 
indefinite detention of refugees and asylum seekers, to the more insidious – the 
displacement of the most marginalized of populations to the outskirts of modern 
cities. Hu suggests we must expect not only more extreme forms of the camp but also 
“always new and more lunatic regulative definitions of the inscription of life in the 
city” (Agamben, 1998). The indefinite detention of refugees in Australia, the brutality 
against detainees at Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib prison are contemporaneous 
examples of how the camp continues to operate in not only western societies but also 
in all modern states as a formidable and potent instrument in the perpetuation of the 
biopolitics of Auschwitz. 
What makes a camp is not necessarily the violence perpetrated inside but 
rather its politico-juridical framework. Thus the camp becomes not only the space 
where the exception becomes the norm, but the space where the sovereign power may 
dictate arbitrarily which politics of life to apply and, hence, a space where the 
distinction between human and inhuman seems no longer to make sense (Puggioni, 
2013). As a result of the dehumanization, sovereign permits violence and even murder 
against these excluded individuals. This was the justification that permitted the Nazi 
regime or others who build camps. 
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It is at this juncture (where the state of exception is invoked) that the potential 
for the human to become the inhuman is at its greatest and most precarious. And, it is 
the camp that ultimately contains and bears witness to this transmogrification because 
it operates as a significant mechanism in the internment of bare life – the product of a 
state of exception (Zannettino, 2008).  
 
4-­‐2.	  Case	  study:	  
  
A comparative analysis of the way different camps are formed under different 
forms of governance in different geographical areas reveals that these governments 
have a single logic in common. Auschwitz in the heart of Europe, Gulags of the 
Stalinist Soviet Union, Guantanamo, where terror suspects were held, Kahrizak, 
where local protesters were detained, and the islands the Australian government uses 
to hold asylum-seekers share two processes: suspension of the state of law and 
dehumanization.  
The similar treatment of the residents of the camps at the hands of rulers –
legitimized violence – the logic that is common in creation of these camps – national 
security concerns – and their presence in different political systems put a seal of 
approval on the theory of Agamben. In fact, creation of camps unmasks the modern 
state, something that dashes hopes of achieving peace in the nation-state system.  
 
4-­‐2-­‐1.	  Nazi	  concentration	  camps;	  Nazism,	  racism	  and	  camp	  	  
  
Establishment of Nazi concentration camps and atrocious tortures against the 
inhabitants of them had its roots in three distinct features of European thought and 
policies in the first half of the 20th century. Traditional anti-Semitism and anti-
“Gypsyism”, a complex mixture of social prejudices – such as the idea that “Gypsies” 
were carriers of dangerous diseases and prone to stealing children whenever possible 
– was widely accepted throughout Europe. In addition, in the 1930's, Hitler and his 
Nazi regime led a campaign of propaganda spreading lies about the Jews.  As the 
"Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda" of the Nazi party, Josef Goebbels 
created a negative image of the Jewish people, blaming them for the economic and 
social problems of Germany and the world. The propaganda was intended to 
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dehumanize the Jews by naming them an “inferior race,” to create widespread anti-
Semitism and lay the groundwork for the elimination of the rights and freedoms of the 
Jews (Federation, 2014). This kind of otherness creation was combined with an 
extreme form of racism, which believed so-called “anti-social behavior” to be a 
hereditary trait of certain groups of population. The third crucial feature of 
persecution mechanisms – introduced by the German Nazis after their ascent to power 
in 1933 – was the system of so-called “preventive fighting of crimes”, which enabled 
the authorities to arrest and imprison everybody, whom they considered to be 
“potentially dangerous” to society, even if they had not committed any crime or 
misdemeanor (Baumgartner, 2007). As a result of these features, we are faced with a 
ideal type of making state of exception and so on the process of dehumanization. 
 Initially, the Nazis encouraged Germans to boycott Jewish businesses. The 
passing of the Nuremberg Laws in 1935 formally established who was a German 
versus who was a Jew under “the Reich Citizenship Law,” and enforced the 
persecution of Jews.  These laws prevented Christians from marrying Jews and 
stripped Jews of their civil rights, removed them from jobs, and restricted their daily 
lives, among other things.	  Passed on September 15, October 18, and November 15 of 
1935, the Nuremberg Laws increased the isolation of the Jews in deliberate, gradual 
steps.  At first, only Jews in certain professions were affected.  Jewish doctors and 
lawyers could only serve other Jews. Teachers and professors were forced out of their 
positions.  Shop owners had to sell their businesses to Aryans for a fraction of their 
worth.  As time passed, Jews were eventually excluded from society altogether. 
 As a farmer marks his cattle with a brand to separate them from his neighbor's 
cattle, the Nazis forced Jews to sew the Star of David on their clothing in order to 
mark and identify them in an attempt to both separate them from the rest of society 
and to shame them. This abuse of the Star of David also distorted a symbol of pride 
that was sacred to the Jews.  The marking of Jews in this way was but a single step in 
the movement to dehumanize them. 
 The Nazi built three types of camps: Ghetto, concentration/labor camps and 
death camps. A ghetto was an isolated section of a city in which Jews were forced to 
live.  The conditions the Nazis created in the ghettos were horrible and unhealthy - 
usually cramped, dirty, and with little food. The Nazis, by design, made the living 
conditions in the Warsaw Ghetto as horrific as possible.  There were curfews and 
guards on duty at all times along the walls to make sure no Jews crossed over to the 
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non-Jewish side.  Many Jews suffered from disease, which spread rapidly in such 
close quarters.  For example, a typhus epidemic broke out about a year after the ghetto 
was created, killing many.  Due to low food rationing, Jews inevitably starved to 
death.  Some chose to kill themselves rather than stand the physical and emotional 
pain any longer. 
 In concentration camps, prisoners were forced to become hard laborers and 
were given very little to eat.  They were forced to wear striped uniforms and 
armbands or labels to identify the type of prisoners that they were. The different 
colors of the bands represented different groups of people.  Due to disease, starvation, 
and harsh treatment by the Nazis, most people died in the concentration camps or 
were deported to death camps where they met with the same fate. 
Death camps, on the other hand, were set up specifically for mass 
murder.  Jews deported to death camps were either shot, or killed in gas vans.  The 
gas vans were tightly sealed, and when prisoners were loaded into the van, the driver 
would press the accelerator releasing carbon monoxide gas that suffocated and killed 
them.  Later, when more structured methods of murder were set up at death camps, 
the prisoners were told they had to take a shower.  The Nazis ordered them to take off 
their clothes and follow signs that said "To the Shower Room."  However, in the so-
called "Shower Room," Zyclon B, a poisonous gas, was released until everybody 
suffocated to death.  Prisoners who exhibited useful strength were made part of the 
sonderkommando, inmates forced to collect the dead bodies and put them in 
crematoriums to be burned. According to these historical facts, a process of making 
otherness, enemy and state of exception was established to dehumanize Jews based on 




4-­‐2-­‐2.	  Gulag:	  Communism,	  Stalinism	  and	  camp	  	  
 
Literally, The word Gulag is an acronym, meaning Glavnoe Upravlenie 
Lagerei, or Main Camp Administration. Over time, the word “Gulag” has also come 
to signify not only the administration of the concentration camps but also the system 
of Soviet slave labor itself, in all its forms and varieties: labor camps, punishment 
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camps, criminal and political camps, women’s camps, children’s camps, transit 
camps. Even more broadly, “Gulag” has come to mean the Soviet repressive system 
itself, the set of procedures that prisoners once called the “meat-grinder”: the arrests, 
the interrogations, the transport in unheated cattle cars, the forced labor, the 
destruction of families, the years spent in exile, the early and unnecessary deaths 
(Applebaum, 2003). In fact, Gulag and Nazi Concentration camps are the ideal types 
of the dominant logic of government in state of exception and the clearest picture of 
legitimized violence deployed by them. But The Nazi concentration camps and the 
Gulag differ in a very important way. Nazi camps were used to exterminate whole 
groups of people, most notably the Jewish population of Europe. The Gulag was used 
as a weapon of ongoing political control over one country. The Gulag system did not 
target any particular group of people: in fact all ethnic groups, nationalities and 
religions were imprisoned (Hosford et al., 2008).  
In other words, Gulag served primarily as a way to gain control over the entire 
population, rather than punish criminal acts. Between 1929, when prison camps first 
became a mass phenomenon, and 1953, the year of Stalin’s death, some 18 million 
people passed through the system. In addition, a further 6 or 7 million people were 
deported to exile villages. The total number of people with some experience of 
imprisonment and slave labor in Stalin’s Soviet Union could have run as high as 25 
million, or about 15 percent of the population (Applebaum, 2001).  
The criminals sentenced to prison camps can be divided into two categories: 
criminals and political prisoners. First group not only included people who committed 
crimes such as murder, rape, and robbery, acts that would be prosecuted in most 
countries but also people who committed “crimes” so minor that they would not be 
punishable in other countries. These “crimes” included unexcused absences from 
work, or petty theft, such as taking bread from a restaurant kitchen to feed one’s 
children. This type of “criminal” made up the vast majority of prisoners in the Gulag 
system, and was punished by sentences of eight–ten years of forced labor. Their 
“trials” usually took five minutes, if there was one at all. Second group were political 
prisoners. This was a group which included opponents of the Soviet regime, but most 
of these people were arrested and sentenced based only on the suspicions of being 
“anti-Soviet.” Political prisoners constituted no more than 25% of the total prison 
camp population at any one time. Political prisoners were charged under Article 58 
and were known in the Gulag system as “58ers.” Article 58 was approved as part of 
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the Soviet criminal code in 1928, and was the main code used to charge and sentence 
“political” prisoners, those supposedly engaged in counter-revolutionary or anti-
Soviet activities. However, the language was so vague and was interpreted so widely 
that it could be applied in almost any case (Hosford et al., 2008).  
In these forced-labor camps deportees had to cope with much harder living 
conditions, on the very edge of survival, and for each and every one of them the 
struggle to cheat death became their greatest endeavor. Everything else was secondary 
to staying alive: the gulag set each one of its victims in competition with the others in 
their search for a crust of bread, a less backbreaking job, a stay in hospital, a lighter 
sentence, anything that could mean an extra day alive. Actually, the gulags were 
organized in a way designed specifically to annihilate prisoner’s inmates 
psychologically and to prevent them from reacting (Radice and Samuelli, 2003). That 
is to say a general climate of dehumanization was dominant in the Gulag.  
The perverse mechanism of treating men as beasts, depriving them of their 
human qualities as they sought desperately to save themselves was a method used to 
control prisoners in the Nazi lagers too. In both cases it served a dual purpose: it 
suppressed the victim’s will to rebel and at the same time facilitated the dirty work 
done by the camp guards, by distancing them from possible humanitarian sensibilities 
and feelings of pity, compassion, altruism. It makes no difference whether the gulag is 
regarded as a place of brutal forced labor or as a means for wiping out “enemies of the 
people”: the methods employed to control prisoners were based on the same 
principles as used by the Nazis against the Jews (Radice and Samuelli, 2003). In fact, 
the life of million people was reduced to bare life by the states that were established 
to free people from the chains of classification. 
 
 
4-­‐2-­‐3.	  Guantanamo:	  Western	  Liberal	  Democracy	  and	  camp	  
 
What is going on at Guantanamo is historically rooted in a deal the United 
States struck with Cuba in 1903, which remains in effect to date. Under the agreement 
the Cuban-owned islands are US jurisdiction. The deal could be revoked only if both 
sides consent to doing so. That is why the island has become a legal black hole, an 
area to which rules of no country are transparently applicable, that has been 
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repeatedly exploited by Democratic and Republican administrations alike as a “covert 
platform” to deal with a variety of perceived threats, from refugees to epidemics to 
terrorism (M.Hansen, 2011). 
Although the United States has used Guantanamo to hold suspects for years, 
the name Guantanamo drew international attention only after America transferred 
9/11 suspects to the island. What happened in Guantanamo was not the violation of 
the rights of inmates at the hands of the US administration; rather it was the humanity 
of the prisoners that was trampled there.     
  In 2002, the first suspected “enemy combatants,” were brought to 
Guantanamo from Afghanistan; at its height it held 775 prisoners from dozens of 
distant countries around the world. The unique qualities developed and tested over the 
last hundred years – its legal ambiguity, its invisibility, its infrastructure – made it 
worth transporting people there from such long distances. Although only one of what 
grew to be a larger network of places to detain suspected terrorists, it became an 
international symbol for a new paradigm of national defense (Sevcenko and Gabriel, 
2011).  
When placed in a human rights frame, Guantánamo is often described in terms 
of the government‘s denial of rights to the prisoners, but equally important has been 
the denial of their humanity. Guantánamo has been a project of dehumanization, in 
the literal sense; it has sought to expel the prisoners—consistently referred to as 
―terrorists—from our shared understanding of what it means to be human, so as to 
permit, if not necessitate, physical and mental treatment (albeit in the context of 
interrogation) abhorrent to human beings. This has been accomplished through three 
forms of erasure of the human: cultural erasure through the creation of a terrorist 
narrative; legal erasure through formalistic legerdemain; and physical erasure through 
torture (Ahmad, 2009).  
While these three dimensions of dehumanization are distinct, they are also 
interrelated. From a cultural aspect, since the moment Guantánamo opened as an 
interrogation center for terrorist suspects, the Bush Administration described the 
prisoners as “the worst of the worst”, as unfathomably dangerous, and as trained and 
hardened killers. As the then- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared in 
January 2002, these are the kind of people who would chew through the hydraulic 
cable of a C–17cargo plane to bring it down. The government coupled these 
characterizations with menacing imagery, as anonymous sources leaked pictures of 
	   50	  
men being transported to Guantánamo while strapped to the floor of a plane, heads 
covered, hands shackled, an American flag draped above, and still more pictures of 
men in orange jumpsuits, crumpled on the ground behind chain-linked fence. Taken 
together, these images helped to construct a state iconography of the “war on 
terrorism”. They told a narrative of transnational forces of evil fanatically committed 
to the destruction of the United States, to which the United States then responds with 
military and moral superiority. Thus, the enemy is subdued, neutralized, and rendered 
abject, and remains broken and contained (Ahmad, 2009). 
According to legal erasure, since the first prisoners arrived at Guantánamo, the 
Bush Administration‘s position had been that they lack any rights whatsoever, under 
any source of law (Ahmad, 2009). Thus did the Bush Administration attempt to define 
a rights-free zone, through a manipulation of rights which seemed demonstrably 
political. For years, hundreds of Guantánamo detainees were denied their right to 
have a judge rule on the lawfulness of their detention. The few that faced criminal 
charges during the Bush years were not brought before any ordinary US court of law; 
instead, for such prosecutions the government invented an ad hoc system of military 
commissions, applying rules that fell far short of international fair trial standards.  	  
The post-September 11 Guantánamo governance regime sought to detain and 
interrogate indefinitely, without charge, and without opportunity for judicial review, 
any non-U.S. citizen in the world whom the Executive deemed to be an “enemy 
combatant”. In addition, the regime contemplated the trial by military commission of 
select “enemy combatants” for alleged war crime offenses, under rules of the 
Executive‘s making. Notably, the “enemy combatant” construct was a legal invention 
of the Bush Administration, distinct from the presumptive “prisoner of war” status to 
which the prisoners otherwise would have been entitled, the intended effect of which 
was to remove the prisoners from the ambit of both the Geneva Conventions and the 
U.S. courts. In this way, in the eyes of the law, the prisoners were made invisible. 
Hidden on a remote and mysterious island, which was made inaccessible to lawyers 
and human rights advocates for nearly two years, the prisoners were nearly erased 
(Ahmad, 2009). 
Taken together, the cultural and legal erasures discussed above enabled the 
physical erasure of prisoners at Guantánamo and in particular, their torture. This is to 
say that law has been deployed to create the preconditions for the exercise of a state 
power so brutal as to deprive the Guantánamo prisoners of the ability to be human. In 
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this way, Guantánamo recalls Hannah Arendt‘s formulation of citizenship as the right 
to have rights (Arendt, 1958). By this she meant that without membership in the 
polity, the individual stood exposed to the violence of the state, unmediated and 
unprotected by rights. The result of such exposure, she argued, was to reduce the 
person to a state of bare life, or life without humanity. What we see at Guantánamo is 
the inverse of citizenship: no right to have rights, a rights vacuum that enables 
extreme violence, so as to place Guantánamo at the center of a struggle not merely for 
rights, but for humanity—that state of being that distinguishes human life from mere 
biological existence (Agamben, 1998). 
 
4-­‐2-­‐4.	  Kahrizak:	  Islamic	  version	  of	  the	  camp	  
 
In the case of Iran, we are faced with a unique kind of process of 
dehumanization through Islamic ideology. In general, The Penal Code of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran allows amputation and flogging for a range of crimes, including 
theft, enmity against God (mohareb) and certain sexual acts. The Iranian authorities 
argue that punishments of this kind sanctioned by Islamic sharia, are not considered 
as a humiliation, a degradation of humanity or torture, and that the application of such 
alternative sentences helps to reduce the incidence of crime and reduce complications 
arising from incarceration (Shahid, 2010).  
Thus, Iran’s government employs the term “Mohareb” to label its opposition 
and legitimize violence against them. Moharebeh in the Islamic context literally 
means "waging war against society" and in Islamic jurisprudence traditionally 
referred to acts such as killing noncombatants, assassinations, setting fires, or 
poisoning water wells, crimes so serious and repugnant that their perpetrators were 
not to be given quarter or sanctuary anywhere (Fadl, 2005).  
In addition, another source states that the concept has its roots in a Quranic 
verse that calls for death, maiming or banishment for those who “wage war” against 
God; “The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger, and 
strive with might and main for mischief through the land is: execution, or crucifixion, 
or the cutting off of hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land: that is 
their disgrace in this world, and a heavy punishment is theirs in the Hereafter.” 
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The term is widely used by Iran's Islamic judiciary, citing Sharia law, and is 
“usually used against those who take up arms against the state,” and usually carries 
the death penalty. This term, however, is used to label all opposition groups during 
the incarceration and interrogates to legitimize the violence of government against 
them. In fact, according to some interpretation of Islamic rules, Islamic government of 
Iran is considered as the representative of Prophet Mohammad government. 
Regarding this interpretation, any kind of opposition would be enmity of God and 
prophet Mohammad. 
 Despite a constitutional prohibition on the use of all forms of torture for the 
purpose of extracting confession or acquiring information, reports continue to be 
received about torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment taking place in 
various places of detention since the establishment of Islamic government of Iran 
(Shahid, 2010). But Kahrizak, where is known as Iran's Guantánamo Bay among 
protesters, became a significant embarrassment for the Islamic Republic when a group 
of released prisoners gave testimonies to international media about the misfortunes 
they suffered in custody after 2009 election protests. 
Authorities first made plans for the Kahrizak detention center in 2001. The 
center's cells, located underground, were apparently built without free access to fresh 
air and toilet facilities. With the appointment of Ahmad Reza Radan to the post of 
Tehran police chief, the center became a key site for carrying out the “Public Security 
Plan” targeting drug addicts and so-called “thugs and louts” endangering public 
morality. Opposition groups have published unverified reports of human rights abuses 
and as many as 6,000 deaths inside the prison during the years 2007 and 2008. 
Several thousand civilians and activists were arrested after the disputed 
presidential election in 2009. The head of the national security forces, Esmail Ahmadi 
Moghadam, stated in an interview with state television on August 5, 2009 that only 
the most dangerous offenders involved in the election protests were to be delivered to 
the Kahrizak center, which has a 50-prisoner capacity. Despite of his claim, the 
number of protesters who were sent to Kahrizak was much more than 50 and many of 
them were students and young demonstrator. 
The Human Rights Activists News Agency documented the scandal by 
piecing together the personal accounts of those who experienced the jail in Kahrizak. 
“Flogging, beating with batons and metal bars and electric shocks were common. 
Some were forced to pose their sexual organ in humiliation and some were sexually 
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abused by bottles and batons. Some were bound and others had to pee on them,” the 
report says. But it was only when 24-year-old Mohsen Rouhalamini, the son of a 
distinguished conservative figure, was named among those killed that the Iranian 
authorities were forced to respond (Dehghan, 2010). 
One of the most controversial issues from Kahrizak was rape of prisoners. The 
issue was first revealed by the 2009 presidential candidate Mehdi Karrubi. He wrote 
in an open letter to Hashemi Rafsanjani, the head of the Expediency Discernment 
Council: “Some savagely raped young boys; many are now suffering from depression, 
or other serious physical and mental problems, and have crawled to a side in their 
homes. I have been told about these things by the people who hold very high offices 
in this country; known icons, a number of whom are veterans of the Holy Defense 
(the Iran-Iraq war). These people have claimed that such things have happened in the 
prisons, and that if even one of them is true, it is a catastrophe for the Islamic 
Republic”(Dehghan, 2010). 
According to interview with some prisoners of Kahrizak, rape was not used 
systemically. Instead, the agent of government used rape as a form of torture in order 
to extract information or forced confession, and in order to bring inmates to 
submission. Surprisingly, most victims of rape and sexual torture were men (Iran, 
2013).  
Clerics serving the political establishment formulated the charge that 
protestors are “fighters against God” (mohareb), and should be sentenced to death. 
The first to proclaim this was apparently Ayatollah Alam Al-Hoda, who during a pro-
government march in Tehran on December 30, said “among the protestors, some are 
sheep and some are goats;” he then called for the execution of Green Movement 
leaders. Ahmad Jannati, president of the government’s Guardian Council, during a 
Friday sermon on January 1, repeated and emphasized that harsh punishment should 
be imposed on those who are “against the Islamic Revolution and against velayat-e-
faqih,” or clerical governance. Interior minister Muhammad Najjar warned protestors 
that if new demonstrations took place, the police would deal decisively with them, 
and also called them mohareb, or “fighters against God.” At the same time, Ismail 
Ahmadi Moghaddam, the head of the national police, said there would be no tolerance 
toward those arrested on Ashura, especially if they had fought police. Member of 
Parliament Ruhollah Hosseinian, said a law would be introduced for “summary 
execution of any mohareb.”  
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In fact, Islamic government of Iran labels their opposition as Mohareb to 
change their legal situation and consequently legitimize violence against them. 
 
4-­‐2-­‐5.	  Australia:	  refugees	  as	  enemy	  
 
Australia, along with other resettlement countries, introduced a system of 
refugee selection in 1979, which was the beginning of the 'off shore" refugee policy. 
According to this policy Australian officials visit refugee camps and centers, and 
along with officials from UN refugee agency, select people to come to Australia. 
Government officials are urged to select those refugees most likely to resettle 
successfully in Australia. These are the young, the healthy, the well educated, and 
people with a family support system already established. An active policy prevents 
selection of those with an obvious disability or those likely to require substantial 
social support. The many refugees who are not fit the stringent requirements of 
developed countries remained in the camps, often for years. The problems which had 
led to them not being accepted in the first place were usually exacerbated by the 
physically and mentally debilitating conditions of camp life. This is the genesis of the 
so-called "queue" which on shore asylum seekers are accused of jumping by the 
Minister for Immigration (Pittway, 2002). 
Throughout late 2001 and 2002, the Australian Government, seeking re-
election, campaigned on a tough line against so-called “illegal” immigrants. 
Represented as “queue jumpers,” “boat people,” and “illegals,” most of these asylum 
seekers came from Middle Eastern countries. According to UN reports two-thirds of 
the detainees were from Iran, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq—all 
countries affected by Australian-backed US military interventions or economic 
sanctions, or the Western-supported repression in Sri Lanka. 
Both Labor and Liberal-National Coalition governments in Australia claim to 
be pursuing this policy for the “humanitarian” purpose of stopping refugees losing 
their lives on dangerous voyages to Australia. But the inhuman conditions outlined in 
the UN reports highlight the fraud of this claim and expose a life-threatening regime 
that is triggering suicide attempts and severe mental trauma. 
In fact, the Australian Government and media try to represent refugees as 
asylum-seeker “crisis”. For an instance, Minister for Immigration and Border 
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Protection Scott Morrison issued a statement about what occurred on Papua New 
Guinea’s Manus Island, where one refugee was killed and dozens injured in or around 
an Australian-run detention camp. Morrison initially reported that the deceased 
asylum seeker, 23-year-old Iranian Kurd Reza Berati, sustained fatal head injuries 
outside the detention center. This account was presented by the government as part of 
its portrayal of the refugees as violent criminals, who had allegedly attempted to burn 
down the camp and escape detention but were then thwarted by Papua New Guinean 
police (O'Conor, 2014).  
In spite of Morrison’s claim, Liz Thompson, an Australian professional 
migration agent who quit her job there after the assault on the detainees in her 
interview on the SBS television told security guards and police, joined by some local 
people, conducted terrifying attacks on detainees inside the facility. Her interview 
further exposed the lies initially told by Morrison that the violence occurred outside 
the camp after refugees escaped (Head, 2014).  
One year before, two reports released in late November by the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reveal the plight of asylum seekers 
banished by the Australian government to the remote Pacific island of Nauru and 
Papua New Guinea’s Manus Island. According to these reports, In Nauru, the UN 
team found detainees living in tents under hot, cramped rat-infested conditions. The 
children were lice-infested, some had skin infections and all suffered deteriorating 
mental health. In one section of the camp holding 305 people in family groups or 
single adult women (including pregnant women), the report observed “cramped 
conditions with very little privacy in very hot conditions, with some asylum-seekers 
sleeping on mattresses on the ground.” These conditions “raise serious issues about 
their compatibility with international human rights law.” The monitors drew particular 
attention to the lack of toilets and showers and the near complete absence of privacy. 
Conditions were similar on Manus Island. The Manus Island asylum seekers were 
concerned about the danger of malaria-carrying mosquitoes and other parasites 
common to the island. Those who were allowed to leave the camp for brief 
excursions, even for a walk or run, were kept under heavy guard. The UN reports 
show that the Australian government is actively pressuring asylum seekers to return to 
the countries they fled. Refugees had received an official letter stating: “if you are not 
pleased with the current processing arrangement, we can put you in touch with the 
International Organization for Migration who may assist you with return to your 
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country of origin”(Church, 2013). 
The UNHCR said the policy meant that refugees risked being driven back to 
their countries, not having made a truly voluntary decision to go. To add to the 
pressure on refugees to give up on their protection claims, decisions on their 
applications have been stalled. Far from pursuing humanitarian concerns, both Labor 
and the Coalition have sought to scapegoat refugees and whip up a nationalist and 
xenophobic atmosphere as a distraction from their own pro-business policies under 
conditions of rising joblessness, sharpening austerity measures and deepening 
economic crisis (Church, 2013). 
The human impacts of these policies are profound, and there has been no 
genuine “solution” aside from an expensive and unsustainable policy of exporting 
onshore arrivals to Australia’s Pacific neighbors. In the meantime, the rhetoric aimed 
at so-called “illegals” and “queue jumpers” is starting to impact on all refugees and 
migrants in Australia. Most disturbingly, Government attacks portraying asylum 
seekers as serial child abusers were also paralleled – those on TPVs remain ineligible, 
presumed “undeserving,” for the family reunion program. Far from offering 
protection, the TPV policy prolongs and compounds the trauma of many asylum 
seekers in Australia today (Leach, 2003). 
 In fact, it is the logic of sovereign exception coupled with the nation-state 
enables the emergence of the refugee and the camp, where the reemergence of bare 
life becomes possible. The refugee, according to Agamben, represents such a 
disturbing element in the order of the modern nation-state because by breaking the 
continuity between man and citizen – nativity and nationality – they put the originary 
fiction of modernity in crisis. In highlighting the difference between birth and nation, 
the refugee causes the secret presupposition of the political domain – bare life – to 
appear if only momentarily within that domain (Agamben, 1998). Thus, the refugee 
represents the first and only real appearance of rights outside the fiction of the citizen 
that always subsumes them. 
 The effects of sovereign power, to a greater or lesser degree, come to be 
inscribed on the private bodies and minds of all human beings who are citizens of 
modern nation-states. Whilst the lives of Australian citizens are in many respects 
shaped and determined by the forces of government (i.e. the control and management 
of reproductive rights, crime and punishment, health and welfare, etc.), citizens are 
afforded basic human rights, which assist to guarantee their fair and just treatment in 
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all legal and social arrangements. Refugees, on the other hand, occupy a paradoxical 
position at the intersection of government control and access to human rights. They 
have no “rights to rights” in a state to which they do not belong but are at the same 
time subject to that same state’s sovereign rule in relation to the treatment of stateless 
peoples. It is at this juncture, where biological body and political body intersect, that 
the refugee becomes the biopolitical centerpiece of what it means to be a human being 




	   In this chapter, first, I have discussed how dominant trend of political thoughts 
after Second World War, Western liberal democracy, depicts the concept of the state 
of exception in relation to totalitarianism and dictatorship. In other words, they to 
conceal the tie between sovereignty, as a common dominator of modern states, and 
state of exception to connect the horrible experience of concentration camps to 
Nazism as a symbol of the absolute power of the negative, which is preventable. 
 In spite of this main trend, Agamben believes the camp is the fundamental 
biopolitical paradigm of modern Western societies. According to this definition, camp 
is a space that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule. 
Regarding Agamben’s point of view some constructing elements of camps could be 
considered, which are common in all the camps regardless of the form of state; first, 
political-juridical structure of the camp in which the state of exception ceases to be a 
temporal suspension of the state of law. Then, the second element is dehumanization, 
which in Agamben’s word is considered as reduction to bare life. That is to say, 
because inhabitants of the camp are divested of political status and reduced to bare 
life, the camp is “the place in which the most absolute conditio inhumana ever to 
appear on Earth was realized.” 
 In the second part of this chapter, I have studied five camps in countries with 
different political ideologies and economic structures. As a result of my study, all 
these camps have been established based on a temporal suspension of law whereby 
state make decision on state of exception and exclusion. The next common step in the 
camps is a widespread brutal violence against excluded people, which is legitimized 
according to special legal situation of them. 
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 Chapter	  five:	  Conclusion 
 
This thesis has attempted to explain the role of modern sovereign state in 
legitimized violence. According to mentioned goal, in current section, I will 
summarize the discussion by coming back to the questions that I suggested in the first 
chapter; 
1. What is legitimized violence and how does the modern government employ it?  
2. What is the relationship between sovereignty and legitimized violence? 
3. What is camp and how does it reveal the role of the modern state and its 
sovereignty regarding violence?  
To answer to the theses questions, I have discussed how a comprehensive 
understanding of what violence is inevitably related to political perspective. 
According to sovereignty and monopolized right of use of force, modern state 
considers itself as the only source of definition of “normal state”. As a result of this 
situation, violence is defined as something to do with a change in this “normal state” 
of affairs. In fact, the foundation and continuity of modern state has been depended on 
the production of a situation in which its right to make decision about what normal is  
seems to be legitimized. 
By categorizing violence into law making and law preserving, it could be said 
that, nowadays, while excessive law-making violence is today somewhat ‘outsourced’ 
from the capitalist center into the periphery, in post-Fordist capitalism of the present 
time mythic violence tends to blur its law-making aspect by turning into an apparently 
implausible juridical web of bio-political practices. This form of law-preserving 
violence functions as a self-producing and self-eternalizing ‘microphysics of power’ 
producing and re-producing, disciplining and controlling, regulating and authorizing 
bare life as actual, potential or superfluous labor force. Mythic violence has therefore 
become the political economy of bare life (Khatib, 2011). 
In the next step, to explain the relation between sovereignty and violence, I 
employed Schmitt’s theory in which the sovereign “is he who decides about the 
exception”. In other words, while the right of modern state to define “normal state” is 
silent and concealed, the presence of sovereignty express itself through making 
decision on exception. Actually, sovereignty is masked behind this accepted normal 
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situation and became visible only during exceptional circumstances. In other words, 
legitimized violence orginates from sovereignty to reconstruct the ”normal state” 
through making decision on ”state of exception”. 
What enables modern sovereign state to decide on the exception is related to 
the concept of “biopower” from Foucault. He connects sovereignty to the body of 
individual and explains the importance of this concept in our understanding of 
contemporary societies. According to the definition of biopower, the concept of 
sovereign power and its close connection to the body of the King has been 
transformed to legitimize sovereignty through social contract. As a result of this fact, 
sovereign right to kill and the mechanisms of biopower, categorization of people, are 
constitutive elements of state power in modernity. 
Regarding sovereignty as right to kill and mechanisms of biopower as 
constructing features of modern state, According to Agamben, the exception would be 
the original relation of the entire Western paradigm of politics. In fact, state of 
exception is a possibility always under the modern state has now led to it becoming 
the predominant political form in liberal democratic countries as well as authoritarian 
ones.  
To examine our theoretical assumptions, the concept of camp is discussed as 
the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of modern Western societies. According to 
Agamben, camp is a space that is opened when the state of exception begins to 
become the rule. Regarding this definition of camp, I analyzed two constitutive 
features of camp, which are common in all the camps regardless of the form of state.  
First, the state of exception becomes a permanent situation in camp. In other words, 
political-juridical structure of the camp could be recognized by a situation in which 
the state of exception ceases to be a temporal suspension of the state of law.  
As a result of this special legal situation, the second feature of camp 
introduced as the process of dehumanization, which in Agamben’s word is considered 
as reduction to bare life. In fact, because inhabitants of the camp are divested of 
political status and reduced to bare life, the camp is “the place in which the most 
absolute conditio inhumana ever to appear on Earth was realized. 
Regarding these two elements, I have analyzed five camps and explained, in 
all these cases, an apparently innocuous space […] actually delimits a space in which 
the normal order is de facto suspended and in which whether or not atrocities are 
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committed depends not on law but on the civility and ethical sense of the police who 
temporarily act as sovereign (Agamben, 1998). 
 I have studied five camps in countries with different political ideologies and 
economic structures. As a result of my study, all these camps have been established 
based on a temporal suspension of law whereby state make decision on state of 
exception and exclusion, a black whole in law that originates from law making feature 
of sovereignty. In addition, the second common element in the camps is a widespread 
brutal violence against excluded people, which is legitimized according to special 
legal situation of them. In fact, modern sovereign state introduced the excluded 
people as perpetrators of fragmentation in ”normal state” of affaris through labeling 
them as ”inferior race”, ”enemy of proletariat”, ”terrorist”, ”Mohareb” and ”crisis”. 
Finally, I want to propose a question to challenge the existing trends; is it 
possible to achieve sustainable peace in a system made up of modern states which are 
the root cause of violence themselves? It seems by accepting the assumptions of this 
thesis, our attempts to achieve peace suffer a methodological weakness in which we 












	   61	  
References:	  
 
AGAMBEN,	  G.	  1998.	  Homo	  Sacer:	  Sovereign	  Power	  and	  Bare	  Life,	  Stanford	  
California,	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  
AGAMBEN,	  G.	  2000.	  Means	  without	  End,	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press.	  
AGAMBEN,	  G.	  2005.	  State	  of	  Exception,	  Chicaho	  and	  London,	  The	  University	  of	  
Chicago	  Press.	  
AHMAD,	  M.	  I.	  2009.	  Resisting	  Guantanamo:	  	  Rights	  at	  the	  Brink	  of	  
Dehumanization.	  Northwestern	  University	  Law	  Review,	  103.	  
ALBA-­‐JUEZ,	  L.	  2009.	  Perspectives	  on	  Discourse	  Analysis:	  Theory	  and	  Practice,	  
Newcastle,	  Cambridge	  Scholars	  Publishing.	  
APPLEBAUM,	  A.	  2001.	  The	  Gulag:	  What	  We	  Now	  Know	  and	  Why	  It	  Matters	  Cato's	  
Letter	  2.	  
APPLEBAUM,	  A.	  2003.	  Gulag:	  A	  History,	  London,	  Doubleday.	  
ARENDT,	  H.	  1958.	  The	  Origins	  of	  Totalitarianism,	  Cleveland,	  World	  Pub.	  Co.	  
ARENDT,	  H.	  1959.	  The	  Human	  Condition,	  Chicago,	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  
ARENDT,	  H.	  1963.	  On	  Revolution,	  New	  York,	  Viking.	  
ARENDT,	  H.	  1970.	  On	  Violence,	  San	  Diego,	  Harcourt	  and	  Barca&	  Company.	  
ARISTOTLE	  1999.	  Politics	  Aristotle,	  Batoche	  Books.	  
B.STRONG,	  T.	  2011.	  Carl	  Schmitt	  :	  political	  theology	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  
political.	  In:	  ZUCKERT,	  C.	  H.	  (ed.)	  Political	  Philosophy	  in	  the	  Twentieth	  
Century:	  Authors	  and	  Arguments.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
BALIBAR,	  E.	  2002.	  Politics	  and	  the	  Other	  Scene,	  London,	  Verso.	  
BARTELSON,	  J.	  1995.	  A	  Genealogy	  of	  Sovereignty,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge.	  
BAUMGARTNER,	  G.	  2007.	  Concentration	  Camps.	  Project	  Education	  of	  Roma	  
Children	  in	  Europe,	  5.1.	  
BECK,	  U.	  2003.	  Toward	  a	  New	  Critical	  Theory	  with	  a	  CosmopolitanIntent.	  
Constellations,	  10,	  453-­‐468.	  
BENJAMIN,	  W.	  1996.	  Critique	  of	  Violence.	  In:	  BULLOCK,	  M.	  &	  JENNING,	  M.	  W.	  
(eds.)	  Walter	  Benjamin;	  Selected	  Writings.	  Massachusetts:	  The	  Belknap	  
Press	  of	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  
BENOIST,	  A.	  D.	  1999.	  What	  is	  Sovereignty.	  Telos,	  116,	  99-­‐118.	  
BERLIN,	  I.	  1979.	  “Nationalism:	  Past	  Neglect	  and	  Present	  Power,”	  Against	  the	  
Current:	  Essays	  in	  the	  History	  of	  Ideas,	  London,	  Hogarth	  Press.	  
BILLIG,	  M.	  1995.	  Banal	  Nationalism,	  London,	  Sage	  Publication.	  
BODIN,	  J.	  2001.	  Six	  Books	  on	  the	  Commonwealth,	  Oxford,	  Basil	  Blackwell	  Oxford.	  
BOHMAN,	  J.	  &	  REHG,	  W.	  1997.	  Deliberative	  Democracy:	  Essays	  on	  Reason	  and	  
Politics,	  MIT	  Press.	  
BOYNE,	  J.	  2006.	  The	  Boy	  in	  the	  Striped	  Pajamas,	  David	  Fickling	  Books.	  
BUFACCHI,	  V.	  2005.	  Two	  Concepts	  of	  Violence.	  Political	  Studies	  Review,	  3,	  193-­‐
204.	  
C.	  E.	  MERRIAM,	  J.	  2001.	  History	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  sovereignty	  since	  Rousseau,	  
Ontario,	  Canada,	  Batoche	  Books.	  
CAMERON,	  D.	  1999.	  Femenist	  Critique	  of	  Language,	  New	  York,	  Routledge.	  
CHURCH,	  M.	  2013.	  UN	  reports	  expose	  conditions	  in	  Australia’s	  offshore	  refugee	  
camps.	  World	  Socialist	  Web	  Site:	  International	  Committee	  of	  the	  Fourth	  
International	  (ICFI).	  
	   62	  
COLATRELLA,	  S.	  2011.	  Nothing	  Exceptional:	  Against	  Agamben.	  Journal	  for	  
Critical	  Education	  Policy	  Studies,	  9.	  
CRISTI,	  R.	  1998.	  Carl	  Schmitt	  and	  authoritarian	  Liberalism,	  niversity	  of	  wales	  
Press.	  
DEHGHAN,	  S.	  K.	  2010.	  Iran's	  Guantánamo	  Bay:	  the	  cover-­‐up	  won't	  work.	  The	  
Guardian.	  
ESTANKO,	  E.	  A.	  2003.	  Conceptualizing	  the	  meaning	  of	  violence.	  In:	  ESTANKO,	  E.	  
A.	  (ed.)	  The	  Meanings	  of	  Violence	  London:	  Routledge.	  
FADL,	  K.	  A.	  E.	  2005.	  The	  Great	  Theft:	  Wrestling	  Islam	  from	  the	  Extremist,	  San	  
Fransisco,	  Harper.	  
FANON,	  F.	  1968.	  The	  Wretched	  of	  the	  Earth,	  New	  York,	  Grove	  Press	  Edition.	  
FEDERATION,	  J.	  2014.	  Dehumanization	  of	  the	  Jews	  [Online].	  Holocaust	  Center.	  
FINLAY,	  C.	  J.	  2009.	  Finally:	  Hannah	  Arendt's	  Critique	  of	  Violence.	  Thesis	  Eleven,	  
26-­‐45.	  
FOUCAULT,	  M.	  1977.	  Discipline	  and	  Punish,	  London,	  Tavistock.	  
FOUCAULT,	  M.	  1990.	  The	  History	  of	  Sexuality:	  An	  Introduction,	  New	  York,	  Vintage	  
Books.	  
FOUCAULT,	  M.	  1994.	  Governmentality,	  New	  York,	  The	  New	  Press.	  
FOUCAULT,	  M.	  1995.	  Discipline	  and	  Punish;	  The	  Birth	  of	  the	  Prison,	  New	  York,	  
Second	  Vintage	  Books.	  
FOUCAULT,	  M.	  2003.	  Society	  Must	  Be	  Defended:	  Lectures	  at	  the	  College	  De	  France,	  
New	  York,	  Picador.	  
GARAY,	  I.	  R.	  D.	  2008.	  Arendt	  and	  Schmitt:	  Toward	  a	  Political	  Grammar	  of	  Violence.	  
Master	  Degree,	  The	  University	  of	  Westminster.	  
GEE,	  J.	  P.	  2005.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Discourse	  Analysis-­‐	  Theory	  and	  Method,	  New	  
York,	  Routledge.	  
GROSS,	  O.	  2003.	  Chaos	  and	  Rules:	  Should	  Responses	  to	  Violent	  Crises	  Always	  be	  
Constitutional?	  The	  Yale	  Law	  Journal,	  112,	  5.	  
HAAN,	  W.	  D.	  2009.	  Violence	  as	  an	  Essentially	  Contested	  Concept.	  In:	  BODY-­‐
GENDROT,	  S.	  &	  SPIERENBURG,	  P.	  (eds.)	  Violence	  in	  Europe;	  Historical	  and	  
Contemporary	  Perspectives.	  Springer.	  
HABERMAS,	  J.	  2001.	  The	  Postnational	  Constellation:	  Political	  Essays,	  Cambridge,	  
Polity.	  
HALL,	  L.	  A.	  2007.	  Death,	  Power,	  and	  the	  Body:	  A	  Bio-­‐political	  Analysis	  of	  Death	  and	  
Dying.	  Master	  of	  Arts	  in	  Political	  Science,	  State	  University.	  
HALL,	  S.	  1997.	  Old	  and	  new	  identities,	  old	  and	  new	  ethnicities.	  In:	  KING,	  A.	  (ed.)	  
Culture,	  globalization	  and	  the	  world	  system.	  Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  
Minnesota	  Press.	  
HEAD,	  M.	  2014.	  More	  evidence	  about	  atrocity	  at	  Australian-­‐run	  refugee	  camp.	  
World	  Socialist	  Web	  Site:	  Published	  by	  the	  International	  Committee	  of	  the	  
Fourth	  International	  (ICFI).	  
HICKMAN,	  T.	  R.	  2005.	  Between	  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law:	  Indefinite	  
Detention	  and	  the	  Derogation	  Model	  of	  Constitutionalism.	  The	  Modern	  
Law	  Review,	  68.	  
HONIG,	  B.	  2007.	  Between	  Decision	  and	  Deliberation:	  Political	  Paradox	  in	  
Democratic	  Theory.	  American	  Political	  Science	  Review,	  101,	  1-­‐17.	  
HOSFORD,	  D.,	  KACHURIN,	  P.	  &	  LAMONT,	  T.	  2008.	  GULAG:	  SOVIET	  PRISON	  CAMPS	  
AND	  THEIR	  LEGACY,	  Harvard	  University.	  
	   63	  
HOWES,	  D.	  E.	  2003.	  The	  Challenge	  of	  Violence	  for	  Political	  Theory.	  Annual	  
Meeting	  of	  the	  American	  Political	  Science	  Association.	  Philadelphia.	  
HUMPHREYS,	  S.	  2006.	  Legalizing	  Lawlessness:	  On	  Giorgio	  Agamben’s	  State	  of	  
Exception.	  The	  European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law,	  17.	  
IMBUSH,	  P.	  2003.	  The	  concept	  of	  Violence.	  In:	  HEITMEYER,	  W.	  &	  HAGAN,	  J.	  (eds.)	  
International	  Handbook	  of	  Violence	  Research.	  Dordrecht:	  kluwer.	  
INDA,	  J.	  X.	  2005.	  Anthropologies	  of	  Modernity;	  Foucault,	  Governmentality,	  and	  Life	  
Politics,	  Blackwell	  Publishing.	  
IRAN,	  J.	  F.	  2013.	  Raped	  out	  of	  Paradise:	  Women	  in	  the	  Prison	  of	  Islamic	  Republic	  
of	  Iran.	  Justice	  for	  Iran.	  
JAMAL,	  S.	  &	  SANDOR,	  A.	  2010.	  Temporarily	  Permanent:	  Agamben	  and	  
Palestinian	  Refugee	  Camps	  in	  Lebanon.	  Canadian	  Political	  Science	  
Association.	  
JANKS,	  H.	  2002.	  Critical	  Discourse	  Analysis	  as	  a	  Research	  Tools	  In:	  TOOLAN,	  M.	  
(ed.)	  Critical	  Discourse	  Analysis.	  London	  and	  New	  York:	  Routledge.	  
JENNINGS,	  R.	  C.	  2011a.	  Cosmopolitan	  Subjects:	  	  
An	  Anthropological	  Critique	  of	  Cosmopolitan	  Criminal	  Law	  and	  Political	  
Modernity.	  Doctor	  of	  Philosophy,	  COLUMBIA	  UNIVERSITY.	  
JENNINGS,	  R.	  C.	  2011b.	  Sovereignty	  and	  political	  modernity:	  A	  genealogy	  of	  
Agamben's	  critique	  of	  sovereignty.	  Anthropological	  Theory,	  11:23,	  23-­‐61.	  
JOAS,	  H.	  1999.	  The	  Modernity	  of	  War:	  	  Modernization	  Theory	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  
Violence.	  International	  Sociology,	  14,	  457-­‐472.	  
KALYVAS,	  A.	  2000.	  Hegemonic	  Svereignty:	  Carl	  Schmitt,	  Antonio	  Gramci	  and	  the	  
constituent	  prince.	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Ideologies,	  5,	  343-­‐376.	  
KHATIB,	  S.	  2011.	  Towards	  a	  Politics	  of	  ‘Pure	  Means’:	  Walter	  Benjamin	  and	  the	  
Question	  of	  Violence.	  Materialist	  Theology.	  
LEACH,	  M.	  2003.	  “Disturbing	  Practices”:	  Dehumanizing	  Asylum	  Seekers	  in	  the	  
Refugee	  “Crisis”	  in	  Australia,	  2001–2002.	  Refuge,	  21.	  
LEMKE,	  T.	  2005.	  A	  Zone	  of	  Indistinction”	  –	  A	  Critique	  of	  Giorgio	  Agamben’s	  
Concept	  of	  Biopolitics	  Outlines.	  Critical	  Social	  Studies,	  7.	  
LUISETTI,	  F.	  2011.	  Carl	  Schmitt	  and	  Giorgio	  Agamben;	  From	  Biopolitics	  to	  
Political	  Romanticism.	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  of	  Life,	  1,	  49-­‐58.	  
M.HANSEN,	  J.	  2011.	  Guantánamo;	  An	  American	  History,	  Hill	  and	  Wang,	  New	  York.	  
MARRAMAO,	  G.	  2000.	  The	  exile	  of	  the	  NOMOS:	  for	  a	  critical	  profile	  of	  Carl	  
Schmitt.	  Cardozo	  Law	  Review,	  21,	  1567-­‐.	  
MBEMBE,	  A.	  2003.	  Necropolitics.	  Public	  Culture,	  15.	  
MERRIAM,	  J.,	  C,E	  2001.	  History	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  sovereignty	  since	  Rousseau,	  
Kitchener,Ontario,	  Canada,	  Batoche	  Books.	  
NAGAN,	  W.	  &	  HAMMER,	  C.	  2003.	  The	  Changing	  Character	  of	  Sovereignty	  in	  
International	  Law	  and	  International	  Relations.	  Columbia	  Journal	  of	  
Transnational	  Law,	  43,	  60.	  
NEAL,	  A.	  2007.	  Georgio	  Agamben	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  exception.	  Sixth	  Pan-­‐
European	  International	  Relations	  Conference	  of	  the	  SGIR.	  Turin:	  University	  
of	  Edinburgh.	  
NEILSON,	  B.	  2004.	  Potenza	  Nuda?	  Sovereignty,	  Biopolitics,	  Capitalism.	  University	  
of	  Western	  Sydney.	  
NEWMAN,	  S.	  2004.	  Terror,	  Sovereignty	  and	  Law:	  On	  the	  Politics	  of	  Violence.	  
German	  Law	  Journal,	  5.	  
	   64	  
NIKANDE,	  P.	  2007.	  Constructionism	  and	  Discourse	  Analysis.	  In:	  HOLSTEIN,	  J.	  A.	  &	  
GUBRIUM,	  J.	  F.	  (eds.)	  Handbook	  of	  Constructionist	  Research.	  New	  York:	  
Guilford	  Publication.	  
O'CONOR,	  P.	  2014.	  Australian	  government	  changes	  its	  story	  on	  refugee	  camp	  
killing.	  2014	  ed.:	  International	  Committee	  of	  the	  Fourth	  International	  
(ICFI).	  
PACKMAN,	  C.	  &	  WRITER,	  F.	  Towards	  a	  Violent	  Absoloute:	  Some	  reflections	  on	  
Zizekian	  Theology	  and	  Violence.	  International	  Journal	  of	  Zizek	  Studies,	  3.	  
PANAGIA,	  D.	  1999.	  The	  Sacredness	  of	  Life	  and	  Death:	  Giorgio	  Agamben's	  Homo	  
Sacer	  and	  the	  Tasks	  of	  Political	  Thinking.	  Theory	  and	  Event,	  3.	  
PITTWAY,	  E.	  2002.	  A	  brief	  history	  of	  refugee	  policy	  in	  Australia.	  Centre	  for	  
Refugee	  Research.	  
POTTER,	  J.	  1996.	  Discourse	  Analysis	  and	  Constructionist	  Approaches:	  
Theoretical	  Background	  In:	  RICHARDSON,	  J.	  T.	  E.	  (ed.)	  Handbook	  of	  
qualitative	  research	  methods	  for	  psychology	  and	  the	  social	  sciences.	  
Leicester:	  BPS	  Books.	  
PUGGIONI,	  R.	  2013.	  Against	  Camps’Violence:	  Some	  Voices	  on	  Italian	  Holding	  
Centres.	  Political	  Studies	  Association.	  
RADICE,	  U.	  &	  SAMUELLI,	  A.	  2003.	  THE	  HISTORICAL	  EXPERIENCE	  OF	  SOVIET	  
TOTALITARIANISM:	  THE	  RIGHTEOUS	  INSIDE	  AND	  OUTSIDE	  THE	  GULAG.	  
The	  Gardens	  of	  the	  Righteous	  Worldwide	  Committee".	  
RADOVANOVIĆ,	  O.	  2007.	  Biopower	  and	  State	  Racism	  by	  Michel	  Foucault:	  How	  the	  
‘Right	  to	  Kill’	  Gets	  Justified	  in	  the	  Modern	  Era	  MASARYK	  UNIVERSITY.	  
RIEDEL,	  M.	  &	  WELSH,	  W.	  2002.	  Criminal	  Violence;	  Patterns,	  Causes	  and	  
Prevention,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  Criminal	  Violence:	  Patterns,	  
Causes	  and	  Prevention	  Riedel	  and	  ...	  
SCHIFFRIN,	  D.	  2005.	  Approaches	  to	  Discourse,	  Oxford,	  Blackwell	  Publisher.	  
SCHMITT,	  C.	  1985.	  Political	  Theology:	  Four	  Chapter	  on	  the	  Concept	  of	  Sovereignty,	  
Cambridge,	  Cambridge,	  MIT	  Press.	  
SCHMITT,	  C.	  2008.	  Cnstitutional	  Theory,	  United	  States,	  Duke	  University	  Press.	  
SCHRAM,	  S.	  F.	  1993.	  Postmodern	  Policy	  Analysis:	  Discourse	  and	  Identity	  in	  
Welfare	  Policy.	  Policy	  Sciences,	  26	  (3),	  249-­‐270.	  
SCMITT,	  C.	  2007.	  The	  Concept	  of	  the	  Political,	  Chicago,	  The	  University	  of	  Chigaco.	  
SEVCENKO,	  L.	  &	  GABRIEL,	  B.	  2011.	  GUANTÁNAMO	  PUBLIC	  MEMORY	  PROJECT.	  
International	  Coalition	  of	  Sites	  of	  Conscience.	  
SHAHID,	  A.	  2010.	  The	  situation	  of	  human	  rights	  in	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Iran.	  
United	  Nations.	  
SHAW,	  K.	  2008.	  Indegeneity	  and	  Political	  Theory,	  London	  and	  New	  York,	  
Routledge.	  
SMITH,	  A.	  1983.	  Nationalism	  and	  Social	  Theory.	  British	  Journal	  of	  Sociology,	  34,	  
19-­‐38.	  
TILLY,	  C.	  2002.	  Violence,	  Terror	  and	  Politics	  as	  Usual.	  
TILLY,	  C.	  2003.	  The	  Politics	  of	  Collective	  Violence,	  Cambridge,	  The	  Press	  Syndicate	  
of	  the	  University	  of	  Cambridge.	  
TRAVERSO,	  E.	  2003.	  The	  Origins	  of	  Nazi	  Violence,	  New	  York	  and	  London,	  The	  
New	  Press.	  
TURPIN,	  J.	  &	  KURZ,	  L.	  R.	  1997.	  Introduction:	  violence.	  The	  micro/macro	  link.	  ,	  
Urbana,	  University	  of	  Illinois	  Press.	  
	   65	  
WEBER,	  M.	  1964.	  Politics	  as	  Vocation.	  In:	  GERTH,	  H.	  H.	  &	  MILLS,	  C.	  W.	  (eds.)	  
From	  Max	  Weber:	  Essays	  in	  Sociology.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
WEBER,	  M.	  1994.	  Political	  Writings,	  Cambridge,	  University	  of	  Cambridge.	  
WEBER,	  M.	  2009.	  The	  Theory	  Of	  Social	  And	  Economic	  Organization,	  New	  York,	  
The	  Free	  Press.	  
WIMMER,	  A.	  1999.	  Verwischte	  Grenzen:	  Zum	  Verhältnis	  zwischen	  Soziologie,	  
Ethnologie	  und	  Volkskunde,	  Borderlines:	  Soziologie,	  Kulturanthropologie	  
und	  Ethnologie.	  Annali	  di	  Sociologia	  –	  Soziologisches	  Jahrbuch.	  
WIMMER,	  A.	  &	  SCHILLER,	  N.	  G.	  2002.	  Methodological	  nationalism	  and	  beyond:	  
nation-­‐state	  building,	  migration	  and	  the	  social	  sciences.	  Global	  Networks,	  
2,	  301–334.	  
WIMMER,	  A.	  &	  SCHILLER,	  N.	  G.	  2003.	  Methodological	  Nationalism,	  the	  Social	  
Sciences,	  and	  the	  Study	  of	  Migration:	  An	  Essay	  in	  Historical	  Epistemology.	  
International	  Migration	  Review,	  37,	  576-­‐610.	  
WOLIN,	  S.	  S.	  1963.	  Violence	  and	  the	  Western	  Political	  Tradition.	  American	  
Journal	  of	  Orthopsychiatry,	  33,	  15-­‐28.	  
ZANNETTINO,	  L.	  2008.	  En/Countering	  the	  Camp:	  bare	  life,	  bio-­‐politics	  and	  
diaspora	  in	  Australian	  refugee	  communities.	  Cultural	  Construct	  and	  
Siaspora.	  Inter-­‐Disciplinary.Net.	  
ZIZEK,	  S.	  2008.	  Violence,	  London,	  Profile	  Books.	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
